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Abstract 
Uncertainty, Investor Learning, and Positive Post-Announcement Returns 
by 
Jedediah Joseph Neilson 
Chair: Gregory S. Miller  
I examine how uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings drives investor 
information gathering and how this activity is associated with stock return patterns around 
earnings announcements.  Investors gather more firm-level information as the earnings number 
deviates further from their prior beliefs and as firm-level and market-wide uncertainty increase 
prior to the announcement. The marginal effect of firm-level uncertainty on information 
gathering declines as market-wide uncertainty increases, consistent with theories of rational 
attention and category learning.  The intensity of these information gathering activities is 
associated with negative abnormal returns in the announcement period and positive abnormal 
returns in the post-announcement period, particularly when information gathering is unlikely 
to fully resolve uncertainty or when additional information available to investors is ambiguous.  
These (seemingly) predictable return patterns are consistent with theoretical predictions about 
how investors respond to uncertainty.  Taken together, the results suggest that proxies for 
investor attention and information gathering inherently capture investor uncertainty and that 
investors require higher future returns when they are unable to resolve uncertainty through the 
analysis of supplemental information. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Investors are exposed to a deluge of firm-level summary signals (e.g., earnings, returns) 
that can be difficult to interpret, particularly if investors are uncertain about the signal’s 
reliability or how it fits into the backdrop of concurrent signals and overall macroeconomic 
conditions.  While it is intuitive that investors could respond to this uncertainty by gathering 
additional information and learning, there is limited empirical evidence about how firm-level 
and macroeconomic uncertainty affect investors’ acquisition and processing of firm-level 
information.  In this paper, I examine how uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings 
affects investor information gathering and how these information gathering activities are 
associated with contemporaneous stock returns around the earnings announcement and 
subsequent returns following the announcement.  
Consistent with theories of rational attention and category learning, I find that investors 
gather more firm-level information as the difficulty of interpreting earnings increases, with this 
relation weakening as macroeconomic uncertainty becomes relatively more important (Peng 
and Xiong 2006). The intensity of information gathering at the earnings announcement is 
associated with negative abnormal returns in the announcement period and positive abnormal 
returns in the post-announcement period for both good and bad news announcements, with the 
association being stronger for bad news.  This return pattern is consistent with theoretical 
models in which the arrival of uncertain information causes a decrease in contemporaneous 
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returns and an increase in expected returns, with these effects being potentially greater for bad 
news (Brown et al. 1988; Campbell and Hentschel 1992). These stock return associations are 
most pronounced when information gathering is unlikely to fully resolve uncertainty (i.e., 
when earnings are particularly difficult to interpret or when the supplemental information 
available to investors is ambiguous).  Taken together, the results are consistent with investors 
allocating attention to better understand uncertain summary signals and requiring higher future 
returns when information gathering is unsuccessful in immediately resolving uncertainty.  The 
results also suggest that researchers should use caution when interpreting returns tests that 
involve measures of attention or information gathering, as these measures may inherently 
capture investor uncertainty.  
When considering how uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings influences 
information gathering, it is helpful to consider the intuition provided by theories of information 
choice (see Veldkamp (2011) for an in-depth review). Because these theories are formalized 
under a common theoretical framework, they consistently point to the following fundamental 
factors that influence behavior with respect to information: (1) the degree to which an 
information signal deviates from agents’ prior beliefs, and (2) the overall uncertainty of agents’ 
prior beliefs. While these models generally assume that an agent learns everything about a 
signal simply by observing it, investors can learn much more about summary signals by 
seeking supplemental information. As I develop predictions related to these two factors, I 
assume that investors observe summary signals (e.g. returns, earnings) at a low cost and then 
decide whether to dedicate scarce time and resources to obtain additional information. 
The first hypothesized factor, a deviation from prior beliefs, is conditional on the 
realization of the signal and leads to a relatively straightforward prediction about information 
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gathering. A signal that deviates from an investor’s expectation may be difficult to interpret 
because it presumably contains information that was not used when forming the expectation.  
For example, as earnings deviate further from investors’ prior beliefs, investors likely become 
more uncertain about the cause of the deviation and its persistence, which heightens incentives 
to gather and analyze additional information about the earnings number. 
The second factor, the uncertainty of investors’ prior beliefs, is not conditional on the 
realized value of earnings and suggests that investors lack information about the impending 
earnings number or future cash flows in general.1 This uncertainty may result from firm-
specific or broader macroeconomic conditions. For example, after a macroeconomic shock, 
investors may be uncertain about how to interpret information, such as earnings, until they 
better understand the extent of any structural shifts resulting from the shock. Firm-related 
information may help investors to learn about the shock and interpret earnings against the 
backdrop of macroeconomic events – or reinterpret earnings as the true nature of structural 
shifts becomes known (Banker et al. 1993; Epstein and Schneider 2008).  
In addition to motivating information gathering and learning, uncertainty has also been 
shown to affect decision-making and asset prices.2  For example, experimental studies have 
found that uncertainty leads to a conservative approach to decision-making, and is associated 
with fear and survival instincts in subjects’ brains (Ellsberg 1961; Smith et al. 2002; Hsu et al. 
                                                          
1 This uncertainty might be separated into two categories: (1) uncertainty about what the earnings number will 
be, which would be resolved by simply observing the reported number without gathering supplemental 
information, and (2) uncertainty about how to interpret whatever number is reported, which likely involves 
gathering additional information. Since I assume that investors observe the earnings number almost costlessly 
and since my intent is to examine uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings, the predictions focus primarily 
on the uncertainty under (2). 
2 I use the term “uncertainty” to characterize an event with an unknown outcome and an unknown probability 
distribution, whereas “risk” characterizes an event with an unknown outcome, but a known probability 
distribution.  “Ambiguity” is also used in prior literature to characterize an unknown outcome and unknown 
probability distribution. 
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2005).  Many theoretical models address uncertainty by assuming that investors do not have 
perfect information about the processes that generate macro- or firm-level signals.  Predictions 
from these models are often consistent with observed capital market phenomena, such as 
seemingly predictable stock returns and asymmetric responses to good vs. bad news 
(Timmermann 1993; Lewellen and Shanken 2002; Epstein and Schneider 2008).  Consistent 
with these theories, empirical research has found that investors appear to initially respond 
pessimistically to uncertainty and require a premium (incremental to risk) for tolerating 
uncertainty (Brown et al. 1988; Anderson et al. 2009; Ozoguz 2009; Johannes et al. 2014).  If 
information gathering is driven by uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings and if 
investors are uncertainty-averse, then we might expect this activity to be associated with lower 
returns when information is released and higher future returns, particularly if investors are 
unable to immediately resolve their uncertainty through information gathering.  This leads to 
the prediction that the intensity of information gathering at the time of the announcement is 
associated with negative abnormal returns in the announcement period and positive abnormal 
returns in the post-announcement period, particularly if earnings are difficult to interpret or if 
additional information about earnings is ambiguous. 
To test these predictions, I use empirical proxies for the economic constructs discussed 
previously. As the primary proxy for investor information gathering, I use a complete record 
of downloads of corporate filings from the SEC’s EDGAR database from 2003 to 2011. This 
download activity is likely to capture the behavior of a broad cross-section of investors – while 
complex filings may be useful to sophisticated investors, the database is free and open to 
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anyone with an Internet connection, which may attract users who do not have access to costlier 
sources of information. 3  
I use this proxy to first test my predictions about how uncertainty motivates information 
gathering. As discussed previously, theories of information choice suggest that uncertainty 
caused by a deviation from prior beliefs creates incentives for information gathering. As a 
primary proxy for deviation from investors’ prior beliefs, I use the analyst forecast error 
(Battalio and Mendenhall 2005). Prior studies also indicate that unsophisticated investors may 
respond to stock returns (Barber and Odean 2008; Kaniel et al. 2008), so I use the [0,1] day 
cumulative abnormal return around the earnings announcement as a secondary measure. 
Consistent with my prediction that uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings drives 
investor information gathering, I find that abnormal download activity on EDGAR increases 
as both earnings and returns deviate from investors’ prior beliefs.  
The second prediction arising from theories of information choice is that the overall 
uncertainty of the environment (firm-level or macroeconomic) prior to the earnings 
announcement drives investor information gathering. The proxy for macroeconomic 
uncertainty is the level of the volatility index on the S&P 500 (VIX) two trading days prior to 
the earnings announcement (Williams 2014). As a primary measure of firm-level uncertainty, 
I use the 30-day option-implied volatility two trading days prior to the earnings announcement. 
To support the construct validity of the firm-level proxy, I use two additional proxies for 
uncertainty prior to the announcement – analysts’ forecast dispersion and the standard 
                                                          
3Chen (2014) finds evidence of broad and geographically diverse information access via EDGAR, with 
concentrations of access in large financial centers (e.g. New York, Chicago, San Francisco, London, etc.).  
Additionally, Ben-Rephael et al. (2015) find that information gathering on EDGAR is positively and 
statistically significantly related to information gathering on Bloomberg terminals, which are commonly used 
by institutional investors. 
6 
 
deviation of returns in the pre-announcement period. Consistent with my predictions, I find 
that the measures of macroeconomic and firm-level uncertainty are all positively related to 
information gathering at the time of the announcement, independent of the realized earnings 
number.  Additionally, while firm-level and macroeconomic uncertainty are independently 
associated with information gathering, the firm-level association weakens as macroeconomic 
uncertainty becomes relatively more important. 
Finally, I examine how investors’ information-gathering activity influences the 
resolution of uncertainty and stock returns in the post-announcement period. Consistent with 
my predictions, I find that the intensity of information-gathering efforts in the announcement 
window is associated with negative abnormal returns in the announcement window and 
positive abnormal returns in the post-announcement window.  As predicted, the association is 
strongest when there is greater uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings (as measured 
by the analyst forecast error, firm-level implied volatility, and VIX) and when information in 
the earnings announcement is more ambiguous (no management earnings guidance or high 
textual complexity).   While the association between information gathering and positive 
subsequent returns is present for both good and bad news announcements (suggesting that it 
isn’t simple over- or under-reaction), it is greater for bad news, which is consistent with some 
theories which predict an asymmetric response to uncertain information (Brown et al. 1988; 
Campbell and Hentschel 1992; Epstein and Schneider 2008).  Finally, I find that information 
gathering at the time of the subsequently filed 10-K or 10-Q is associated with price increases 
later in the post-announcement period, consistent with investors using subsequently released 
supplemental information to resolve residual uncertainty from the earnings announcement.   
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This paper contributes to prior research along several dimensions.  First, research 
across multiple disciplines (e.g., information theory, economics, information science) has 
examined how uncertainty motivates information seeking.  This research, while extensive, is 
limited mostly to theoretical and experimental studies unrelated to capital markets.  Exploring 
the theories and testing the external validity of the experiments in a natural setting has been 
difficult, due principally to a paucity of empirical measures of investor information gathering. 
Using a novel measure of information gathering, I find evidence that is broadly consistent with 
the theoretical predictions and experimental results of prior research. A particularly novel 
finding is that both firm and macroeconomic uncertainty independently drive firm-level 
information gathering, but when macroeconomic uncertainty is high, the incremental effect of 
firm-level uncertainty declines.  This is consistent with theories of rational inattention and 
category learning, which predict that investors vary the attention that they place on market- 
and sector-level factors vs. firm-specific factors, depending on the relative importance of each 
(Peng and Xiong 2006).  
Second, this study contributes to a recent stream of literature that uses novel empirical 
measures to examine the relation between information gathering and stock returns.  I extend 
this literature by specifically examining how the uncertainty associated with summary signals 
influences information gathering, and by providing evidence that clarifies the results of 
previous studies. Drake et al. (2014b) find that filing download activity on the SEC’s EDGAR 
database around earnings announcements is associated with a lower return drift in the direction 
of the earnings surprise, which they interpret as a more efficient price response to earnings.  In 
contrast, I find that the lower return drift documented by Drake et al. (2014b) is attributable to 
a price reversal following bad news announcements (i.e., information gathering is associated 
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with positive abnormal returns following both good and bad news).  While traditional tests of 
market efficiency might classify these return patterns as evidence of inefficient information 
processing, the results in this paper suggest that they may be attributable to an uncertainty 
premium.  These results may also help explain the higher future returns associated with firm-
specific Google search documented by Da et al. (2011).  They attribute these initial returns 
(along with relatively weak evidence of a longer-term reversal) to inefficient, attention-driven 
buying.  However, if firm-specific Google search acts as an empirical proxy for uncertainty, 
these seemingly predictable return patterns may be partially due to the presence of an 
uncertainty premium (Lewellen and Shanken 2002). 
Finally, this paper is related to prior empirical studies which examine the association 
between uncertain information and stock returns.  Many of these studies do not examine 
particular information events, but instead use abnormal returns as a proxy for information and 
make no assumption about the intensity of investor information gathering (Brown et al. 1988).  
A recent study by Williams (2014) examines stock return patterns around earnings 
announcements and finds that macroeconomic uncertainty is associated with a seemingly 
pessimistic interpretation of the earnings number, and that this response appears to be driven 
by investor ambiguity aversion. I extend this research by examining how investors attempt to 
resolve their uncertainty concerns and by documenting a connection between information 
gathering and positive post-announcement returns. These results are consistent with the initial 
earnings response documented by Williams (2014) and support the presence of an ambiguity 
premium, particularly when investors are initially unable to resolve uncertainty by gathering 
additional information.  
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This paper should be of interest to investors, as it documents the presence of a premium 
when there is uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings (provided investors are willing 
to tolerate residual uncertainty).  The paper should also be of interest to managers interested in 
large-sample empirical evidence of how uncertainty and disclosure content influence investor 
demand for, and interpretation of, supplemental information.  Moreover, the paper should be 
of interest to researchers and regulators who study investor attention and the informational 
efficiency of stock prices. When there is uncertainty about the interpretation of summary 
signals, it may appear that information gathering is associated with less efficient information 
processing; however, these return patterns may be related to investors learning about uncertain 
signals.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Uncertainty, rational attention, and information choice 
The connection between uncertainty and information gathering is prevalent in a variety 
of academic literatures, including information theory, economics, and information science.4  
Among the pioneering efforts in this area were in the information theory literature by Shannon 
(1949), who developed a model of communication that has been applied in a variety of fields 
including communications engineering, computer science, and economics.  The model 
involves six elements: an information source, a transmitter, a channel, a receiver, a destination, 
and noise, which interferes with the message traveling through the channel and leads to 
uncertainty about the content (and therefore interpretation) of the communication.   
In addition to formalizing the relation between information and uncertainty, an 
important feature of the Shannon model is that the channel through which the information 
passes has a finite capacity.  This constraint was later used by Sims (2003) in the development 
of models of rational inattention, which attempt to explain why information, even when it is 
freely available, may not be used (or may be imperfectly used).  These models have been 
extended beyond the initial focus of price stickiness to include other settings and other 
cognitive processes.  For example, Peng and Xiong (2006) develop a model in which 
                                                          
4 Shannon (1949) and Weaver (1949) helped formalize the connection between information and uncertainty and 
this work was later extended by Sims (2003) in developing implications for rational attention. The connection 
between information and uncertainty is prevalent in the information science literature (see Case (2012) for a 
review of the literature, including notable contributions by Belkin (1978) and Kuhlthau (1993)). 
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cognitively constrained investors rationally allocate their limited attention between market- or 
sector-level factors and firm-specific factors, depending on the relative importance of each.   
Models of information choice are related to models of rational attention in that they 
often arrive at similar predictions (although under different assumptions and potentially 
different policy implications).  Among these models of information choice are passive-learning 
models, in which agents are differentially endowed with information or information arrives 
stochastically (Mankiw and Reis 2002; Morris and Shin 2002) and active-learning models in 
which some proportion of agents intentionally acquire information by purchasing it, allocating 
limited attention to it, or taking some other action that will generate the information (Grossman 
and Stiglitz 1980; Hellwig 1980; Hirshleifer et al. 2011).  The cost or effort of acquiring 
information in the active learning models has an effect that is similar to the capacity constraint 
in the rational attention models – it essentially makes information gathering costly, which 
results in some agents choosing not to obtain the information. Since these models are based on 
a Bayesian updating framework, they point to intuitive fundamental factors that influence 
behavior with respect to information: (1) the magnitude of a signal’s deviation from the agent’s 
prior beliefs, (2) the overall uncertainty of the agent’s prior beliefs about the signal, and (3) the 
precision of the information signal.  
While the predictions from these information-related models are seemingly intuitive, 
empirical support for them from capital market settings is largely indirect.  For example, 
empirical studies of stock return co-movement provide indirect evidence of category learning 
behavior by investors (e.g., Shiller (1989); Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993)).  Other empirical 
studies examine settings in which investor attention is expected to be constrained or diverted 
and find that stock returns show signs of a less efficient aggregation of information (e.g., 
12 
 
Huberman and Regev (2001); Hirshleifer et al. (2009); Dellavigna and Pollet (2009)).  Other 
studies find that properties of the earnings signal are associated with measures of price 
efficiency, with some positing that the uncertainty of the signal or information processing costs 
hinder an efficient response to earnings signals (e.g., Foster et al. (1984); Ball (1992); Francis 
et al. (2007); Zhang (2006)) 
The paucity of direct empirical examination of the forces that drive information gathering has 
likely been due to a lack of suitable empirical proxies for investor information gathering.  In 
recent years, there have been several empirical studies that have used novel proxies to examine 
the relation between investor information gathering and stock returns (e.g., Da et al. (2011); 
Drake et al. (2010); Drake et al. (2014a)); however, these papers focus more on the relation 
between information gathering and stock returns than on the economic forces that drive the 
information gathering behavior. 5  While these studies generally contain analyses that attempt 
to explore the empirical determinants of information gathering, those test are principally 
intended to demonstrate that the proxies for investor attention and information gathering are 
correlated in a meaningful and intuitive way with commonly used empirical variables.  That 
is, these exploratory analyses are intended to support the empirical validity of these newly 
available proxies rather than to test economic hypotheses about the fundamental drivers of 
information gathering. 
                                                          
5 These papers, along with others that examine the relation between information gathering and stock returns, are 
discussed in more depth in the following section.  They use similar measures as proxies for variously named 
constructs – investor attention, investor information demand, information acquisition, etc.  While I use these 
terms interchangeably, I generally use the term “information gathering” to describe the behavior inherent in 
these proxies. 
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2.2 Information gathering and stock returns 
As noted in the previous section, direct evidence regarding the relation between 
information gathering and stock returns has historically been scant, due principally to a lack of 
reasonable proxies for investor information gathering.  However, several recent studies have 
used novel empirical measures to examine the relation between information gathering and 
stock returns using, but have arrived at somewhat divergent conclusions. Drake et al. (2012) 
find that firm-specific Google search prior to the earnings announcement is associated with a 
timelier price response around the announcement. Da et al. (2011) use firm-specific Google 
search as a measure of investor attention and find that, in general, it is associated with 
inefficient price fluctuations (short-term price increase, followed by relatively weak evidence 
of a reversal). They also find that Google search contributes to the seemingly inefficient first-
day return and subsequent underperformance of IPOs. Drake et al. (2014b) find that 
information access on the SEC’s EDGAR database is associated with a lower return drift in 
the direction of the earnings surprise, which they interpret as a more efficient price response 
to earnings. While an IPO is a very different information event from an earnings 
announcement, these results provide somewhat conflicting results about the association 
between information gathering and the efficiency with which the market impounds information 
into prices.  
In order to bring clarity to these potentially conflicting results, it may be helpful to 
consider more carefully the economic drivers of investors’ information gathering activities.  
While these studies briefly explore some of the determinants of information gathering, the 
primary intent of those analyses appears to be the validation of the empirical proxies of 
attention or information gathering.  By considering more carefully the economic factors that 
14 
 
influence these activities, it may be possible to interpret these results more cohesively.  For 
example, if uncertainty is indeed a fundamental driver of investor information gathering, this 
may alter predictions about the expected association between information gathering activities 
and stock returns or change the interpretation of empirical results.  
Prior research has found that uncertainty is an important factor in how individuals 
process information and make decisions (Ellsberg 1961; Holt and Laury 2002).  More 
specifically, experimental studies have found that uncertainty leads to a conservative approach 
to decision-making, and is associated with fear and survival instincts in subjects’ brains 
(Ellsberg 1961; Smith et al. 2002; Hsu et al. 2005).  This behavioral tendency is reflected in 
theoretical models that assume investor ambiguity aversion or parameter uncertainty.  These 
models generally start with the assumption that investors have uncertainty about the 
probabilities over payoffs (Turner et al. 1989; Epstein and Schneider 2007, 2008).  For 
example, investors may have uncertainty about a state variable or they may not fully 
understand the process that generates earning numbers or returns, which causes uncertainty 
about the parameters of those distributions or an inability to arrive at a single probability 
distribution. In the models, investors respond pessimistically6 to uncertain information (or even 
the expectation of uncertain information) and demand higher future returns for tolerating 
uncertainty.  These higher future returns can be accelerated (i.e., the premium can dissipate) if 
uncertainty is resolved.  These models claim to help explain many potentially puzzling 
empirical observations, such as seemingly predictable stock returns, asymmetric responses to 
good vs. bad news, and the equity premium and excess volatility puzzles (Timmermann 1993; 
Lewellen and Shanken 2002; Epstein and Schneider 2008).   Consistent with these theories, 
                                                          
6 This is often represented in the models as investors facing a set of probability distributions over payoffs, who 
then select the worst-case probability distribution (Klibanoff et al. 2005; Epstein and Schneider 2007, 2008). 
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empirical research has found that investors appear to respond pessimistically to uncertainty 
and require a premium (incremental to risk) for tolerating uncertainty (Brown et al. 1988; 
Anderson et al. 2009; Ozoguz 2009; Johannes et al. 2014). 
Additionally, one of the interesting aspects of theories of uncertainty or ambiguity 
aversion is that they predict that the quality of information available to investors and the extent 
of information gathering play a much greater role in the magnitude of the equity premium than 
models in which investors are only risk averse (Epstein and Schneider 2007, 2008). This aspect 
may be helpful in distinguishing between alternative explanations for empirical associations 
between measures of information gathering and stock returns. 
In summary, understanding the economic drivers of information gathering is critical 
for interpreting empirical associations between measures of information gathering and stock 
returns.  One potential reason for the seemingly conflicting interpretations from prior empirical 
studies may be that the predictions and interpretation of empirical results don’t adequately take 
into account the fundamental drivers of information gathering.  If uncertainty is a fundamental 
driver of information gathering, then empirical predictions regarding the relation between 
information gathering and stock returns may become clearer, and empirical analyses based on 
those predictions may help explain seemingly inconsistent prior results. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Hypothesis Development 
In this section I develop predictions about how uncertainty over the interpretation of 
earnings drives information gathering and how these information gathering activities are 
associated with contemporaneous and subsequent stock returns. 
3.1 Uncertainty and information gathering 
To develop predictions about the factors that motivate investors to gather information, 
I rely on the intuition provided by models of active learning discussed in the previous section.  
Since most of these models are based on a Bayesian updating framework, they point to similar 
fundamental factors that influence behavior with respect to information: (1) the magnitude of 
a signal’s deviation from the agent’s prior beliefs, and (2) the overall uncertainty of the agent’s 
prior beliefs about the signal.7  While these factors seem intuitive, the application of their 
intuition to predictions about investor behavior in a capital-market setting requires additional 
discussion. In most of these models, the agent is assumed to learn everything about the signal 
simply by observing it; however, investors often observe summary signals of uncertain quality, 
such as earnings or returns, and then must decide whether they will seek additional information 
about the signal. As I form predictions based on these factors, I assume that investors easily 
                                                          
7 In addition to these two fundamental drivers, the models also indicate that the precision of the information signal 
is an important determinant of behavior with respect to information. The models generally assume that the 
precision of the signal is independent of the deviation from prior beliefs; however, this may not be the case with 
accounting earnings (Beaver et al. 1980; Subramanyam 1996). For this reason, I do not consider how the precision 
of earnings influences information gathering, but acknowledge that proxies for deviations from prior beliefs may 
partially capture the noise in earnings. 
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observe summary signals (e.g. earnings, returns) at a relatively low cost and, after observing 
the signal, must decide whether additional information gathering is necessary.  
One setting with several of these attributes that has been examined in the theoretical 
literature is a firm’s decision about when to perform a review of its pricing policies. For 
example, Woodford (2009) recognizes that there is a cost to gathering information and that the 
decision about whether to gather information is based on a signal that is much less precise than 
the information that the company will have after completing the pricing review. This setting is 
analogous to an investor who must decide whether to fully review a company’s performance 
(e.g., by reading the earnings announcement and other supplemental information), based only 
upon an observation of the earnings number or stock return. The model in Woodford (2009) 
predicts that firms will conduct pricing reviews only intermittently and that the likelihood of 
performing a review is increasing in the magnitude of the economic shock.  
The intuition from Woodford (2009) carries over to the setting of an investor deciding 
whether to seek more information after observing earnings or returns. An earnings number that 
deviates from the investor’s prior belief clearly contains information not used in the formation 
of the belief. A minor deviation may not lead to significant uncertainty about how to interpret 
earnings; however, as the deviation grows, the investor may become more uncertain about the 
importance of the information that was apparently not used in forming his belief. In other 
words, the deviation is indicative of a knowledge gap that could be filled if the investor seeks 
additional information about what caused the deviation. Therefore, I expect that the uncertainty 
created by deviations from investors’ prior beliefs will cause investors to gather information 
about what caused the deviation, which leads to the following formal prediction: 
P1: Investors gather more firm-related information as outcomes deviate from 
investors’ prior beliefs 
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The second factor highlighted by theories of information choice is the uncertainty of 
investors’ prior beliefs. If an investor knows relatively little prior to observing a signal, any 
information about the signal is potentially valuable. That is, the less an investor knows about 
the properties of the signal before it arrives, the greater his incentives will be to learn as much 
as he can about it.  Of course, if an investor is only uncertain about what the value of the signal 
realization will be, then this uncertainty would be resolved simply by observing the signal.  
However, in capital markets, there is often significant uncertainty about how to interpret 
signals, regardless of the realized value. This uncertainty can be resolved by evaluating the 
signal in light of information previously collected, by gathering additional available 
information, and/or by waiting for more information to be revealed.  
Uncertainty about how to interpret the reported earnings number (regardless of its 
properties) could clearly be related to firm-specific factors, but it also may be related to 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Prior research suggests that macroeconomic uncertainty can 
cause difficulty in interpreting new information, including firm-level information (Aboody et 
al. 1999; Illeditsch 2011; Drechsler 2013; Williams 2014). If there has been a macroeconomic 
shock, investors may be uncertain about the extent to which long-term fundamentals may have 
shifted. Gathering more firm-level information may help investors to better understand the 
extent of the macroeconomic shock and how much the firm is affected by it, as well as helping 
to reinterpret earnings as new information becomes available (Epstein and Schneider 2008). 
This discussion leads to the following formal prediction about how the uncertainty of prior 
beliefs influences information-gathering behavior:  
P2(a): Higher firm-level and macroeconomic uncertainty leading up to an earnings 
announcement are associated with increased information gathering at the time 
of the announcement 
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If there is meaningful variation in information gathering in accordance with these 
predictions, this provides additional evidence that investors do face constraints on their 
information gathering capacity (i.e., constraints on attention) and that uncertainty about how 
to interpret earnings is an important factor that drives their information gathering decisions.  
However, theories of attention and category learning also suggest that the nature of this 
uncertainty may influence the level of investor attention to firm-level information.  In a limited-
attention model, Peng and Xiong (2006) make the intuitive prediction that investor attention 
will fluctuate between  macroeconomic- or sector-level factors and firm-specific factors, 
depending on the relative importance of each.  Thus, uncertainty of any type might drive 
overall investor attention to increase, but there may be relative shifts in the type of information 
gathered by investors.  When macroeconomic uncertainty is high, investors may allocate 
relatively less attention to firm-level information, and vice versa when firm-specific 
uncertainty is high relative to macroeconomic uncertainty. This results in the following formal 
prediction: 
P2(b): The relation between firm-level uncertainty and firm-level information 
gathering is declining in the level of macroeconomic uncertainty leading up 
to the earnings announcement 
 
3.2 Information gathering and stock returns 
If empirical tests are consistent with these initial predictions, this suggests that investors 
don’t learn everything about earnings simply by observing the number.  While this would be 
unsurprising, it does have implications for how stock returns are associated with measures of 
information gathering.  As discussed in the previous section, theories related to uncertainty and 
ambiguity aversion predict that stock returns may exhibit unique and seemingly predictable 
patterns when investors are uncertain about how to interpret new information.  The theories 
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predict that investors will initially appear to respond pessimistically to uncertain information 
(i.e., negative abnormal returns when the information is released) and they will demand higher 
future returns for tolerating uncertainty, particularly if the uncertainty can’t be immediately 
resolved (Brown et al. 1988; Lewellen and Shanken 2002; Epstein and Schneider 2008).  Thus, 
if investor information gathering around the earnings announcement is driven by uncertainty 
about how to interpret the earnings number, then we might expect these activities to inherently 
act as a proxy for uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings, which would clearly affect 
the predicted empirical associations between these activities and stock returns.  
On the other hand, if investors are successful in resolving their uncertainty by gathering 
information then we might not expect to see these predicted associations.  Yet it seems unlikely 
that the collection of additional information will always allow investors to fully resolve the 
uncertainty that motivated them to search in the first place.  That is, we might expect these 
associations between information gathering and returns to be concentrated in situations where 
information gathering is less likely to fully resolve uncertainty.  One situation where this may 
occur is if the earnings number is particularly difficult to interpret.  Note that this doesn’t 
assume decreasing returns to learning when uncertainty is high (which would be inconsistent 
with the first three predictions related to uncertainty and information gathering).  Instead, this 
assumes that information gathering is less likely to fully resolve investor uncertainty about the 
interpretation of earnings if uncertainty is high to begin with.  In summary, if uncertainty drives 
information gathering and if information gathering is sometimes unsuccessful in resolving 
uncertainty, then we would predict the following: 
P3(a): Investor information gathering at the time of the earnings announcement is 
associated with negative abnormal returns in the announcement period, 
particularly if there is significant uncertainty about the interpretation of the 
earnings number 
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P3(b): Investor information gathering at the time of the earnings announcement is 
associated with positive abnormal returns in the post-announcement period, 
particularly if there is significant uncertainty about the interpretation of the 
earnings number 
Until now, the predictions have essentially assumed that the properties of information 
available to investors are held constant. However, the degree to which investors are able to 
resolve uncertainty by gathering additional information should also be related to the properties 
of the information that they obtain and analyze.  For example, if investors go to the earnings 
announcement to resolve uncertainty about the earnings number, but they find that the 
announcement also contains ambiguous information, this would clearly hinder their ability to 
resolve uncertainty about earnings.  Thus, the ambiguity of information in the earnings 
announcement would lead to a greater amount of residual uncertainty, leading to the following 
formal prediction –  
P4: The association between information gathering and positive post-announcement 
returns is heightened when information in the earnings announcement is more 
ambiguous 
Finally, theories of uncertainty aversion and ambiguity aversion predict that the 
premium will dissipate as uncertainty is resolved.  Uncertainty may be resolved in many ways, 
including – the passage of time, the occurrence or nonoccurrence of economic events, or the 
release of information by the firm.  In the earnings announcement setting, most firms typically 
release information at the earnings announcement (e.g., press release, financial statements, 
etc.) and then release the much more detailed regulatory filing (10-K or 10-Q) on or after that 
date.  If there is residual uncertainty after the earnings announcement, investors may seek to 
resolve this uncertainty by gathering additional information at the time that the more detailed 
regulatory filing is released.  Since the regulatory filing would normally only elaborate further 
upon information in the earnings announcement, we wouldn’t expect the filing to add to the 
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uncertainty.  Therefore, any information that is gathered from the filings should reduce 
uncertainty (or, at worst, leave uncertainty unchanged if the filing is   a noisy source of 
information or a repetition of the earnings announcement).  Based on these theories, any 
resolution of uncertainty would cause the premium to dissipate, which would essentially lead 
to returns being “pulled forward” into the current period. This leads to the following prediction 
–  
P5: Investor information gathering of subsequent SEC filings that pertain to the 
earnings announcement is associated with positive abnormal stock returns later 
in the post-announcement period 
If I find evidence supporting these predictions it would be broadly consistent with a 
prevailing theoretical link between uncertainty and information gathering that spans multiple 
literatures (Shannon and Weaver 1949; Belkin 1978; Kuhlthau 1993; Sims 2003; Case 2012). 
The results would also provide evidence that investors perceive greater gains to information 
gathering when uncertainty is high and that their attention to firm-level information can 
fluctuate based on the relative importance of macroeconomic factors (Sims 2003; Peng and 
Xiong 2006).  Finally, the results would be consistent with investors requiring higher future 
returns if they are unable to fully resolve their uncertainty through information gathering and 
would underscore the importance of supplemental information in helping investors to resolve 
uncertainty about summary signals. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Research Design and Data 
4.1 Research design 
My objective is to study how uncertainty about the interpretation of an information 
signal drives investor information gathering and how this behavior is associated with the 
resolution of uncertainty and subsequent stock returns. While this study could potentially 
examine any information event, I focus on quarterly earnings announcements as a setting for 
the following reasons: (1) they involve information that can be important enough to 
substantially revise investors’ prior beliefs, (2) theories of information choice suggest that prior 
beliefs are an important driver of behavior with respect to information and earnings 
announcements offer proxies for investors’ beliefs that are not available for other information 
events, and (3) they are periodic and therefore allow for observations of investor and firm 
behavior across time.  
Because I am interested in how investors respond to an uncertain signal, I examine 
information gathering beginning on the day the earnings number is released and extending one 
day after. For certain tests I also explore how investors resolve residual uncertainty after the 
earnings announcement by examining information gathering around the subsequent release of 
the 10-K or 10-Q.  
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4.2 Data 
As documented in Table 1, the primary sample consists of quarterly earnings 
announcements for the years 2003–11. I restrict the time period by the availability of my 
principal measure of information gathering – a complete record of filing downloads from the 
SEC’s EDGAR database for the years 2003–11. This data contains filing downloads for all 
companies that have a reporting requirement with the SEC, which is much more expansive 
than the coverage of databases such as Compustat and CRSP (Drake et al. 2014b). 
Consequently, the number of observations is constrained by the availability of coverage in the 
following databases: Compustat, CRSP, IBES, ThomsonReuters 13f, and OptionMetric, as 
documented in Table 1.  
4.2.1 EDGAR filing downloads 
The SEC’s EDGAR database contains public company filings since 1996 (with partial 
participation from public companies from 1994 to 1995). Each time a file is viewed or 
downloaded on EDGAR, a record is created on the SEC’s server logs. Through a Freedom of 
Information Act request, I obtained this server log for January 2003 to December 2011.8 The 
analyses in this paper utilize the following information from the server log:  
1. The partial IP address of the requesting user; to preserve the privacy of the user, the 
final octet of the address was replaced with three letters, which still allows for the 
identification of unique IP addresses 
2. The date and time of the filing request 
3. The Central Index Key (CIK) of the company that submitted the filing 
4. The accession number, which uniquely identifies each filing 
 
Not all of the records on the server logs result from direct requests by human users. For 
example, automated web crawlers may download large numbers of filings in a short period of 
                                                          
8 The server logs appear to only contain a partial record of downloads from January 2003 to May 2003 and from 
October 2005 to March 2006. The results of statistical tests are insensitive to the exclusion of these months.  
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time. While these requests reflect information gathering of some kind, it is difficult to 
determine if filing views are associated with meaningful information processing. In order to 
remove filing requests that may not reflect direct investor information search, I remove all 
downloads for a particular user (i.e. IP address) on a particular day if that user (1) downloaded 
more than 5 filings in a one-minute interval at any time during the day (Lee et al. 2014), (2) 
downloaded more than 100 filings on that day, where at least 90% of the filings are text files9 
(Lee et al. 2014), or (3) downloaded more than 1,000 total filings on that day (Drake et al. 
2014b). The reduction in the number of filing requests due to these restrictions is consistent 
with prior research (Lee et al. 2014). 
While the information in the EDGAR server logs can identify unique IP addresses, it 
is not intended to convey the identity of the individual or organization associated with that IP 
address. Although searcher identities are not explicitly known, this download log likely 
captures a fairly broad cross-section of investor sophistication levels. While complex filings 
may be more useful to sophisticated investors, the database – which is free and open to anyone 
with an Internet connection – is  also likely to attract users (such as retail investors) who don’t 
have access to costlier sources of information. This is supported by Chen (2014), who finds 
evidence of broad and geographically diverse information access via EDGAR, with 
concentrations of access in large financial centers (e.g. New York, Chicago, San Francisco, 
London, etc.), and by Ben-Rephael et al. (2015), who find that information gathering on 
EDGAR is positively and statistically significantly related to information gathering on 
                                                          
9 The complete submission file is a text file that contains the full submission for that accession number, including 
HTML tags, binary code for embedded graphics and PDF files, etc. It is often downloaded for machine-readable 
tasks but is very difficult for humans to read. Since the vast majority of filings are in HTML format, I assume that 
an IP address that downloads a large proportion of text files in a particular day is not a direct search activity by a 
human. 
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Bloomberg terminals, which are commonly used by institutional investors.  Drake et al. 
(2014b) also conclude that EDGAR download activity is consistent with the activities of a 
sophisticated investor conducting fundamental comparative analysis. 
4.2.2 - Alternative measure of information gathering 
As an alternative measure of information gathering, which is intended to specifically 
capture the information gathering behavior of unsophisticated investors, I use the Google 
Search Volume Index (SVI) from Google Trends for individual S&P 500 ticker symbols for 
the years 2005–8.10 Most of the analyses using Google SVI are untabulated, but the results are 
described in the text. 
The Google SVI has been used in prior studies as a measure of investor information 
demand (Drake et al. 2012) and as a measure of investor attention (Da et al. 2011). The Google 
SVI measure does not represent absolute search volume, but measures a search term’s 
popularity relative to all Google searches over time. It is also normalized based on the highest 
relative search volume for that particular ticker over time. Therefore, SVI captures within-firm 
variation in the relative search popularity of a firm’s ticker (Drake et al. 2012). Google SVI 
contains far less detail than the EDGAR server log, but prior research suggests that Google 
SVI likely captures the behavior of less sophisticated investors.11   
4.2.3 - Other Data 
Other variables used in the analyses come from the Compustat, CRSP, IBES, and 
OptionMetrics databases. These variables are described in more detail in the next section. 
                                                          
10  I am grateful to Michael Drake for providing the Google SVI data through his website – 
http://byuaccounting.net/ drake/ProgramsData1.php. This data was used for analyses in Drake et al. (2012). 
11 Da et al. (2011) find that monthly changes in orders and turnover from retail investors are associated with 
changes in Google SVI and conclude from this that changes in investor attention measured by SVI are related to 
trading by retail investors. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Empirical Results 
5.1 Measures of information gathering 
For my principal measure of information gathering (EDGAR downloads), I construct 
an abnormal search variable that adjusts for firm and day-of-week effects that have been 
documented in prior literature (Drake et al. 2012). This is intended to adjust for a typical level 
of download activity that may not be related to the release of new information by the firm. The 
abnormal download volume on EDGAR for firm i on day t is calculated as the total filing 
downloads (of selected filing types12) on day t minus the average downloads from the same 
weekday over the eight-week period ending two weeks prior to the earnings announcement, 
scaled by the average downloads from the same weekday over the eight-week period ending 
two weeks prior to the earnings announcement. I then take the average of this daily variable 
over the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement to arrive at a measure 
of abnormal EDGAR download activity (INFO_ACCESS) for the earnings announcement 
period.13 Therefore, the mean of 0.564 for INFO_ACCESS (Table 2) indicates that the average 
download volume for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement was 
56.4% higher than the average of the same two weekdays during the estimation period.  
                                                          
12 I limit this to filings that investors would typically find informative: (1) earnings announcements and press 
releases (8-K, 8-K/A), (2) interim financial reports (10-Q, 10-QSB, 10-Q/A, 10-K, 10-KSB, 10-K/A), (3) 
registration statements (S-1, S-1/A), and (4) proxy statements (DEF 14A). Results are similar when using all 
filing types or when restricting it to only earnings announcements (8-Ks) in the earnings announcement window. 
13 Results of analyses are generally stronger when using the raw EDGAR downloads instead of this abnormal 
measure. In all cases the inferences drawn from the analyses are the same when using raw downloads or abnormal 
downloads. 
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My secondary measure of information gathering is Google SVI. As described 
previously, Google SVI is already standardized, so I use the average raw Google SVI for [0,1] 
trading-day window to arrive at the measure of Google search (GOOGLE). The mean of 1.208 
(Table 2) indicates that the relative search popularity of a firm’s ticker symbol is 20.8% higher 
in the [0,1] trading-day window around the firm’s earnings announcement.14 
5.2 Uncertainty and information gathering 
The first prediction is that investor information gathering is increasing in the degree to 
which outcomes deviate from investors’ prior beliefs. As a primary proxy for deviation from 
investors prior beliefs, I use the analyst forecast error (Battalio and Mendenhall 2005). Prior 
studies have also indicated that unsophisticated investors respond to stock returns (Barber and 
Odean 2008; Kaniel et al. 2008), so I use the [0,1] day cumulative abnormal return around the 
earnings announcement as a secondary measure. To calculate analyst-adjusted earnings 
(ANALYST_UE), I subtract the median of the most recent individual analyst forecasts issued 
within the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement date from the IBES reported actual 
“street” earnings and then scale this by the price per share as of the end of the quarter. 
Abnormal stock returns (CAR[0,1]) are calculated as the daily return for the stock minus the 
value-weighted market return for the same day, cumulated over the [0,1] trading-day window 
around the earnings announcement.15  
                                                          
14 Since the EDGAR and Google SVI data are available for every calendar day, the [0,1] trading-day window 
may contain more than two calendar days (e.g., announcements on Fridays or days prior to a holiday). This reflects 
the nature of information gathering (i.e., information gathering can occur on days when the market is not open). 
However, in order to ensure that day-of-week effects are not driving any results, I include a day-of-week fixed 
effect in all regressions. Also, recall that INFO_ACCESS is an abnormal measure of EDGAR downloads that 
attempts to adjust for day-of-week effects. 
15 The results throughout the paper are similar when using alternative measures of abnormal returns (market 
model, Fama French three-factor model, and Carhart four-factor model).  
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For initial evidence on the univariate relation between prior beliefs and investor 
information search, I graph the average of INFO_ACCESS across deciles of ANALYST_UE 
and CAR[0,1] (see Figure 1). The graph clearly indicates that INFO_ACCESS increases as 
each proxy deviates from investors’ prior beliefs. In fact, the mean of INFO_ACCESS for both 
measures is lowest in the decile with the smallest deviation from prior beliefs. 
In order to ensure that other extraneous factors are not driving this result and to 
determine if the observed relationships are statistically significant, I perform the following 
regression analysis:  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼_𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀         (1) 
where INFO_ACCESS is the mean abnormal EDGAR filing downloads for the [0,1] trading-
day window around the earnings announcement for firm i in period t. BELIEF_ERROR is the 
deviation from prior beliefs for firm i in quarter t. (Since my prediction is related to the 
magnitude of deviations from prior beliefs, I use the absolute value of ANALYST_UE and 
CAR[0,1].) In order to mitigate the risk that results are attributable to outliers (e.g., due to 
scaling of unexpected earnings), I construct deciles (by quarter) for ANALYST_UE. This results 
in the following variables being used for BELIEF_ERROR in Equation (1): 
ABS_ANALYST_UE_DEC is the decile (by quarter) of the absolute value of ANALYST_UE 
and ABS_CAR[0,1] is the absolute value of CAR[0,1].  
I also control for other factors that may influence abnormal search, but are not related 
to deviations from investors’ prior beliefs. To control for the firm’s visibility and information 
environment, I include the following controls: (1) the natural log of the market value of equity 
(LN_MVE) for firm i at the end of period t, (2) the natural log of the number of analysts 
(ANALYST_FOL) following the firm at the end of the month prior to the earnings 
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announcement, and (3) the percentage of institutional owners (INST_OWN) at the end of the 
month prior to the earnings announcement. To control for the relative importance of 
disclosures about capitalized assets and future earnings growth, I include the ratio of book 
value of equity to market value of equity (BOOK_MARKET) for firm i at the end of period t. 
Finally, to control for the overall constraints on investors’ cognitive resources (Hirshleifer et 
al. 2009), I include the total number of earnings announcements on the same calendar day as 
the firm’s earnings announcement (EA_COUNT). In order to control for other potential 
unobservable stationary factors that may influence investor information search, I also include 
firm fixed effects (unless otherwise noted in the tables). In order to also control for systematic 
influences on investor information search for all firms in a given quarter, I include quarter 
fixed effects. I also include fiscal quarter and day-of-week fixed effects to control for 
systematic differences in investor search behavior that may vary depending on the day of the 
week or the fiscal quarter for which the firm is announcing earnings. 
Table 4, Panel A contains the results of the regression specified in Equation (1), where 
the dependent variable is INFO_ACCESS. Models (1) and (2) contain 
ABS_ANALYST_UE_DEC and ABS_CAR[0,1] as measures of prior beliefs, respectively. 
Model (3) contains both measures. Model (4) is identical to Model (3), except it contains firm 
fixed effects. In all of the models the coefficient on the measure of deviations from prior beliefs 
is positive and statistically significant. In Models (3) and (4), where the earnings surprise 
variable and abnormal returns are included together, the coefficients are both positive and 
significant, indicating that both earnings and returns independently motivate investors to 
search for information as each measure deviates from investors’ prior beliefs. This suggests 
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that INFO_ACCESS is likely capturing the behavior of sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors (Battalio and Mendenhall 2005; Barber and Odean 2008; Kaniel et al. 2008). 
In untabulated results, I replace INFO_ACCESS with GOOGLE as the dependent 
variable and find that the coefficient on ABS_CAR[0,1] is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, but the coefficient on ABS_ANALYST_UE_DEC is negative and statistically 
insignificant (p-value=0.47). This is consistent with the information gathering behavior of 
unsophisticated investors being driven by stock returns, but not earnings (Barber and Odean 
2008; Kaniel et al. 2008; Da et al. 2011).  
In terms of magnitude, Model (1) indicates that a three-decile (approximately one 
standard deviation) increase in ABS_ANALYST_UE_DEC is associated with a 13% average 
increase in INFO_ACCESS. Model (2) indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
ABS_CAR[0,1] is associated with a 27% average increase in INFO_ACCESS. For the 
untabulated analysis using GOOGLE, a one-standard-deviation increase in (ABS)CAR[0,1] is 
associated with a 14% average increase in GOOGLE.16 
Taken together, the results presented in Table 4, Panel A are consistent with the visual 
univariate evidence in Figure 1and are consistent with Prediction 1 from Section 3 – that 
investor information gathering increases as outcomes deviate from investors’ prior beliefs. The 
results (including untabulated results using GOOGLE as the dependent variable) also suggest 
that these prior beliefs may be based on different signals depending on the investors’ level of 
sophistication. 
                                                          
16 When interpreting these magnitudes, one should keep in mind that the abnormal search measures can be 
negative. The percentages calculated as magnitudes are based on the means of these variables reported in Table 
2.  
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The second prediction is that information gathering is increasing in firm-level and 
macroeconomic uncertainty about earnings leading up to the earnings announcement. To test 
this prediction, I perform the following regression analysis: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼_𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀                                                    (2) 
 As the primary firm-level proxy for uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings 
(UNCERTAINTY) I use the 30-day implied volatility for options on the firm’s stock from the 
OptionMetrics Standardized Options dataset two trading days prior to the earnings 
announcement (IMP_VOL).17 As secondary measures for UNCERTAINTY at the firm level I 
use: (1) the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts as of the end of the month prior to the 
earnings announcement, divided by the mean share price for that month (ANALYST_DISP) and 
(2) the standard deviation of returns for the 60 trading days ending on day t-3 before the 
earnings announcement (SDEV_PRE_RET). The proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty is the 
volatility index on the S&P 500 (VIX) two trading days prior to the earnings announcement 
(Williams 2014). 
Models (1), (2), and (3) in Table 4, Panel B contain results for the regression specified 
in Equation (2), where INFO_ACCESS is the dependent variable and IMP_VOL, 
ANALYST_DISP, and SDEV_PRE_RET are (respectively) the independent variable of interest 
(the previously discussed proxies of UNCERTAINTY at the firm-level).18  Model (4) contains 
                                                          
17 These are derived from hypothetical at-the-money options with a duration of 30-days. Standardized options are 
constructed to be of constant maturity and at-the-money, which has been shown to reduce measurement error due 
to varying option durations and the extent to which they are in the money (Dumas et al. 1998; Hentschel 2003).  
Results are also robust to using implied volatility from options with a 90-day duration. 
18 Barron et al. (1998) use forecast error and forecast dispersion to develop measures of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry in analysts’ information environment.  While the focus of this paper is investor (rather 
than analyst) information gathering, these same properties of analyst forecasts are used as proxies for investor 
uncertainty.  In untabulated tests, I use the measures of uncertainty and information asymmetry developed in 
Barron et al. (1998) and find that there is a positive and statistically significant relation between INFO_ACCESS 
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the macroeconomic proxy for UNCERTAINTY – VIX. Because VIX is the same for all firms 
that announce on a given day and the level of the VIX may not have significant variation for a 
given quarter, I do not use calendar quarter fixed effects in regressions that contain the level 
of the VIX. In all of these regressions, the proxy for UNCERTAINTY is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that firm-level and macroeconomic uncertainty motivate investors to 
gather additional information. Model (5) contains both the principal proxy for firm-level 
uncertainty (IMP_VOL) and the proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty (VIX). Coefficients on 
both variables are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firm-level and 
macroeconomic uncertainty hinder investors ability to interpret the earnings number and are 
(independently) associated with increased information gathering by investors.  Model (6) 
contains an interaction of IMP_VOL and VIX and is intended to test Prediction 2(b) – that firm-
level uncertainty becomes less important as a driver of firm-level information gathering as 
macroeconomic uncertainty increases.  The negative coefficient on this interaction term 
suggests that this is the case, which is consistent with theories of rational attention and category 
learning (Peng and Xiong 2006). As predicted, each of these results is not conditional on the 
magnitude of the deviation from prior beliefs (i.e., analyst-adjusted earnings and abnormal 
announcement period returns are included in the model as controls). 
In untabulated tests, I replace INFO_ACCESS with GOOGLE in models (1) and (4) 
and find that the coefficient on IMP_VOL is positive and significant (p-value=0.005) and the 
coefficient on VIX is positive and significant (p-value=0.05), respectively. When both VIX and 
IMP_VOL are included together in the regression, the coefficient on IMP_VOL is positive and 
                                                          
and their measure of uncertainty, but the relation between INFO_ACCESS and their measure of information 
asymmetry is not statistically significant.  These results are consistent with the results in Table 4, Panel B, 
which suggest that overall uncertainty leading up to the earnings announcement is associated with increased 
information gathering at the time of the announcement.  
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statistically significant (p-value=0.024), but the coefficient on VIX is statistically insignificant 
(p-value=0.815). This is consistent with the results in Table 4, Panel A – that information 
gathering by unsophisticated investors is primarily driven by firm-level abnormal stock 
returns. This provides further evidence that firm-level uncertainty motivates (unsophisticated) 
investors to gather additional information.  
In terms of magnitude (from the coefficients in models (1) and (4) of Table 4, Panel 
B), a one-standard-deviation increase in IMP_VOL (VIX) is associated with a 9% (9%) average 
increase in INFO_ACCESS. For the untabulated results using GOOGLE as the dependent 
variable, a one-standard-deviation increase in IMP_VOL (VIX) is associated with a 10% (5%) 
average increase in GOOGLE.  
Taken together, the results in Table 4, Panel B provide evidence that the uncertainty of 
investors’ prior beliefs is a significant driver of information gathering at the time of the 
earnings announcement (independent of the extent to which earnings deviates from investors’ 
prior beliefs). Consistent with predictions in Section 3, this association exists when uncertainty 
about the interpretation of earnings is due to firm-level or macroeconomic uncertainty, but the 
relation between firm-level uncertainty and firm-level information gathering weakens as 
macroeconomic uncertainty increases in relative importance. 
5.3 Information gathering and post-announcement returns 
 The third prediction examines how investors’ information gathering activities are 
associated with contemporaneous and subsequent stock returns.  As previously discussed, this 
isn’t the first study to examine these associations; however, examining them with a better 
understanding of what is driving the behavior (i.e., uncertainty) leads to different predictions 
and interpretation of empirical results, which may help clarify the results of prior research.   
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Thus, it may be useful to first perform a traditional test of informational efficiency that has 
been used in prior studies.  Drake et al. (2014b), examines how information gathering on 
EDGAR affects market efficiency with respect to earnings news. Using a traditional post-
earnings announcement drift regression similar to this:  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸[2,50]𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                        (4) 
they find a negative coefficient on the interaction of INFO_ACCESS and UE. This is consistent 
with a lower return drift in the direction of the earnings surprise, which they interpret as 
evidence of a more efficient price response to earnings news. In Table 5, I replicate this result 
by performing the regression analysis summarized in Equation (4) where both analyst-adjusted 
and seasonally adjusted earnings are used as measures of unexpected earnings (UE).19 The 
controls include the other variables that have been used in prior tests, as well as their 
interactions with UE. Consistent with the findings in Drake et al. (2014b), there is a negative 
coefficient on the interaction of INFO_ACCESS and UE, suggesting a lower abnormal return 
drift in the direction of the earnings surprise. However, in Model (3) I replace the signed post-
announcement returns (CAR[2,50]) with the absolute value of CAR[2,50] and remove the 
interactions with UE. The coefficient on INFO_ACCESS is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that information gathering at the time of the earnings announcement is 
associated with more volatile returns in the post-announcement period. This seems inconsistent 
with a more efficient response to earnings (using traditional tests of market efficiency) and 
suggests that the results in the traditional post-earnings announcement drift regressions 
(Models (1) and (2)) are attributable to a return reversal.  
                                                          
19 I include seasonally adjusted earnings because this is the measure of unexpected earnings used in (Drake et al. 
2014b). 
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Figure 2 plots the price paths of four portfolios of high and low information gathering 
and high and low unexpected earnings. High earnings is the top quintile of analyst-adjusted 
earnings (ANALYST_UE) and low earnings is the bottom quintile of ANALYST_UE. High 
information gathering is the top quintile of INFO_ACCESS and low information gathering is 
the bottom quintile.  
The price paths in the figure appear to confirm that the results in Models (1) and (2) of 
Table 5 (traditional post-earnings announcement drift regressions) are attributable to a return 
reversal for low earnings/high search firms. There also appears to be a greater positive drift 
for high search firms with high earning. This would be consistent with Prediction 3(b), which 
states that investor information gathering at the time that earnings information is released is 
associated with positive abnormal returns in the post-announcement period.  Although this 
return pattern might seem unusual (i.e., an apparent under-reaction to good news and an over-
reaction to bad news), it is exactly what might be predicted by theories of uncertainty or 
ambiguity aversion. However, the visual evidence may not be statistically significant and it 
may be driven by other factors, such as the sorting of firms within quintiles of unexpected 
earnings and quintiles of information gathering.  
To confirm the validity of the visual evidence and formally test the predictions 
enumerated in Section 3, I use a multivariate regression approach to examine the association 
between information gathering and contemporaneous and subsequent abnormal returns around 
the earnings announcement.  The previously discussed theories predict that investors will 
initially appear to respond pessimistically to uncertain information (i.e., negative abnormal 
returns when the information is released) and that expected returns will increase (i.e., positive 
abnormal returns in the post-announcement period).  Thus, if uncertainty drives information 
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gathering, we might expect to see a negative (positive) relation between investor information 
gathering at the time of the earnings announcement and announcement (post-announcement) 
period abnormal returns.  To test this, I perform a multivariate regression analysis based on the 
following model:  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸[0,1]𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴_𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                         (5) 
Because the predicted association does not depend on the sign of earnings, I do not interact 
INFO_ACCESS with a measure of unexpected earnings or an indicator for good/bad news.  
Model (1) of Table 6, Panel A contains the results of this regression analysis for the 
full sample. As predicted, the coefficient on INFO_ACCESS is negative and statistically 
significant.  The prediction also states that this relation is expected to be stronger in situations 
where there is significant uncertainty about the interpretation of the earnings number.  To test 
this, I perform regression analyses based on the following model:  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸[0,1]𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +∑𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                 (6) 
where UNCERTAIN is one of the three main sources of uncertainty about the interpretation of 
earnings that were explored in the previous section: (1) macroeconomic uncertainty leading up 
to the announcement (VIX), (2) firm-level uncertainty leading up to the announcement 
(IMP_VOL), and (3) the degree to which earnings deviate from investors’ prior beliefs 
(ANALYST_UE). A negative coefficient on the interaction of UNCERTAIN and 
INFO_ACCESS would be consistent with a greater discount when information gathering is 
unlikely to immediately and fully resolve uncertainty. This also helps to rule out alternative 
explanations, such as loss aversion or negativity bias, which should not be conditional on the 
level of uncertainty (discussed along with other alternative explanations in Section 6).  
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Models (2), (3), and (4) in Table 6, Panel A contain the results of the Equation (6) 
regression analyses for each of the measures of UNCERTAINTY. To aid interpretation of the 
main effect on INFO_ACCESS, I use an indicator for each measure of UNCERTAINTY. For 
VIX, the indicator is equal to 1 if the level of the VIX is higher than 20 (HI_VIX from the 
analysis in Table 4, Panel B). For firm-level implied volatility, it is equal to 1 if IMP_VOL is 
greater than its median (0.439, see Table 2). For unexpected earnings, the indicator is equal to 
1 if earnings fall in the bottom or top quintile of ANALYST_UE. In each case, the coefficients 
on the interaction of UNCERTAINTY and INFO_ACCESS are negative and statistically 
significant. This is consistent with the prediction that investors appear to react pessimistically 
to uncertain information, particularly when there is significant uncertainty about how to 
interpret the earnings number.  
To investigate if the association between information gathering and negative 
announcement period returns is statistically significant for both good and bad news, I partition 
the sample into good news (zero or positive ANALYST_UE – Model (5)) and bad news 
(negative ANALYST_UE – Model (6)). Since Models (2) through (4) suggest that information 
gathering is most effective when uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings is high, I 
restrict Models (5) and (6) to times when the VIX is above 20 (i.e., when HI_VIX=1). I find 
that coefficient on INFO_ACCESS is negative in both cases and is statistically significant for 
bad news (t-stat=-5.91) and nearly statistically significant for good news (t-stat=-1.64).  The 
fact that the results are asymmetrically larger and more significant for bad news is consistent 
with predictions of theories of uncertainty aversion (Brown et al. 1988; Campbell and 
Hentschel 1992; Epstein and Schneider 2008).   
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Finally, Model (7) of Table 6, Panel A includes the alternative measure of information 
gathering – GOOGLE – as the variable of interest instead of INFO_ACCESS. The coefficient 
on GOOGLE is negative, but not statistically significant, which could be related to a lack of 
power due to the small sample size or because investors who search on Google are (based on 
the results in Table 4, Panels A and B) responding to stock prices, rather than uncertainty about 
the interpretation of earnings. 
While the results of Table 6, Panel A are consistent with the prediction, it is difficult 
conclude that there is a causal relationship because this is merely a contemporaneous 
association between information gathering and stock returns.  More convincing evidence might 
be found in tests of Prediction 3(b) – that there is a positive association between information 
gathering at the earnings announcement and subsequent abnormal returns.  To test this, I 
replace the dependent variable in Equation (5) with the post-announcement abnormal return 
(CAR[2,50]).  Note that the only difference between this model and the traditional post-
earnings announcement drift regression (Model (4)) is the omission of interactions with UE. 
This omission will allow the coefficient on INFO_ACCESS to capture the predicted 
unidirectional (i.e., positive) return pattern that is hypothesized in the post-announcement 
period following both good and bad news.   
Model (1) of Table 6, Panel B contains the results of this regression analysis for the 
full sample. As predicted, the coefficient on INFO_ACCESS is positive and statistically 
significant.  Like the prediction related to the announcement window returns, the relation is 
expected to be stronger in situations where there is significant uncertainty about the 
interpretation of the earnings number.  To test this, I replace the dependent variable in Equation 
(6) with the post-announcement abnormal return (CAR[2,50]).  Models (2), (3), and (4) in 
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Table 6, Panel B contain the results of this regression analysis.  The coefficients on each of the 
interactions of UNCERTAINTY and INFO_ACCESS are positive and statistically significant. 20 
This is consistent with the prediction that uncertainty-driven information gathering is 
associated with higher expected returns, particularly when there is significant uncertainty about 
the interpretation of the earnings number.  
To investigate if the association between information gathering and positive post-
announcement returns is statistically significant for both good and bad news, I partition the 
sample into good news (zero or positive ANALYST_UE – Model (5)) and bad news (negative 
ANALYST_UE – Model (6)). As in Panel A, I restrict Models (5) and (6) to times when the VIX 
is above 20 (i.e., when HI_VIX=1). I find that coefficient on INFO_ACCESS is positive and 
statistically significant in both cases.  Finally, Model (7) of Table 6, Panel B includes the 
alternative measure of information gathering – GOOGLE – as the variable of interest instead 
of INFO_ACCESS. The coefficient on GOOGLE is positive and statistically significant, 
although care should be taken in the interpretation of this result, as the results in Table 4 
suggested that investors who search on Google appear to be responding to stock returns in the 
post-announcement period, rather than uncertainty about the interpretation of the earnings 
number.   
Taken together, the results in Table 6, Panels A and B, indicate that the intensity of 
information gathering is associated with negative abnormal returns in the announcement 
window and positive abnormal returns in the post-announcement window following both good 
                                                          
20 In untabulated tests of Model (2), I define the VIX indicator (HI_VIX) using different levels of the VIX. I find 
that the association between post-announcement returns and information gathering is concentrated in periods 
when the VIX is very high (e.g., over 40).  This suggests that this uncertainty premium may only be present 
under very high levels of uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings.  This may also explain why the results 
in this study differ from those in similar studies (e.g., Ben-Rephael et al. (2015)) in which the sample covers 
time periods when uncertainty rarely reaches those levels.  
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and bad news.  While these return patterns may initially appear to be indicative of a less 
efficient response to earnings, they are inconsistent with an overall delayed response to 
earnings news (i.e., the results suggest an overreaction to bad news and an under-reaction to 
good news). However, these return patterns are consistent with theories of uncertainty 
aversion, which predict that investors respond to uncertainty by behaving as if they interpret 
the earnings number pessimistically, while requiring higher future returns as compensation for 
bearing residual uncertainty (Epstein and Schneider 2008; Williams 2014).  
Until now, the analyses have assumed that the uncertainty of additional information 
gathered by investors is held fixed; however, (as set forth in Section 3, Prediction 4) the 
ambiguity of supplemental information about earnings may limit investors’ ability to resolve 
their uncertainty about earnings.  This would lead to a larger uncertainty premium and would 
imply a greater association between information gathering and post-announcement returns.  To 
test this prediction, I perform a regression analysis based on Equation (5) and partition the 
sample on two proxies for the ambiguity of information in the earnings announcement.  The 
first proxy for ambiguity is whether the firm issued earnings guidance in conjunction with the 
earnings announcement.  When there is significant uncertainty about the interpretation of 
earnings, a management forecast of future earnings would likely serve as a relatively 
straightforward and unequivocal piece of information for reducing uncertainty (i.e., providing 
better information on the parameters of the distribution of earnings or eliminating potential 
probability distributions over future earnings).  The second proxy for the ambiguity of 
information in the earnings announcement is the textual complexity of the announcement.21  
                                                          
21  To measure textual complexity, I use the Automated Readability Index, which is a measure of textual 
complexity, computed as follows: 4.74 ∗ �𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎 � + 0.5 � 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎� − 21.43 , where 
characters is the number of letters, numbers, and punctuation marks, words is the number of spaces, and sentences 
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The intuition for this proxy is that increased textual complexity can inhibit investors’ ability to 
extract information from the announcement and could lead to ambiguous interpretations 
(Rayner and Duffy 1986; Bloomfield 2002; Li 2008).   
Table 7 contains the results of this analysis.  Models (2) and (4) show the partition of 
firms with more ambiguous earnings announcements (no earnings guidance and high textual 
complexity, respectively). 22  Models (1) and (3) show the partition of firms with lower 
ambiguity in the earnings announcement.  Consistent with predictions, the coefficient on 
INFO_ACCESS is positive and highly significant for firms with more ambiguous earnings 
announcements.  The coefficient on INFO_ACCESS for low ambiguity earnings 
announcements (Models (1) and (3)) is statistically insignificant for both measures (t-stats of 
0.93 and 0.15, respectively).  These results support the presence of an uncertainty premium 
and suggest that this premium is larger when ambiguity in the content of the earnings 
announcement inhibits investors from reducing uncertainty through information gathering. 
The final prediction is related to the impact of subsequent information releases.  An 
interesting feature of the earnings announcement setting is that additional information about 
earnings is released by the firm in the weeks after the announcement. The 10-Q (quarters 1–3) 
and 10-K (quarter 4) contain significantly more information than the earnings announcement 
and would likely offer an opportunity for investors to gather information and learn, particularly 
if there is significant residual uncertainty about the interpretation of earnings. To explore this 
                                                          
is the number of sentences (Kincaid et al. 1975).  For each firm-quarter, I adjust the firm’s ARI by the mean 
industry (four-digit SIC) ARI for that same calendar quarter. 
22 The number of observations in these analyses are lower for several reasons – (1) the earnings guidance data 
that I use is only available through 2010, (2) I obtained the earnings announcement text from the 8-K’s on EDGAR 
and some firms (particularly earlier in the sample) may not have filed an 8-K in conjunction with the earnings 
announcement, and (3) since I adjust the firm’s textual complexity score (ARI) by the mean industry (four-digit 
SIC) ARI for that same calendar quarter, I eliminate observations where the abnormal ARI is zero (e.g., if the 
firm is the only earnings announcement for the four-digit SIC in that calendar quarter).  
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possibility, I restrict the sample to times when the VIX is above 20 (i.e., when HI_VIX=1) and 
partition the post-announcement period between 2 to 25 trading days after the announcement 
(CAR[2,25]) and 26 to 50 trading days after the announcement (CAR[26,50]).  
 Consistent with the results in Table 6, Panel B I find that information gathering at the 
time of the announcement (INFO_ACCESS) is positively associated with CAR[2,25] and 
CAR[26,50]. I also find that information gathering during the [0,6] trading-day window around 
the release of the 10-Q or 10-K (INFO_ACC_FILING) is not associated with positive abnormal 
returns in the [2,25] trading-day period, but it is associated with positive abnormal returns in 
the [26,50] trading-day period. 23  This is consistent with the subsequent release of the 10-Q or 
10-K allowing for the resolution of residual uncertainty from the earnings announcement 
period. I also find that returns during the [2,25] trading-day period are negatively related to the 
number of days between the earnings announcement and the filing of the 10-Q or 10-K. This 
is consistent with the idea that uncertainty cannot be resolved without information and the lag 
in the release of additional information delays the dissipation of a premium related to 
uncertainty. To ensure that there is no return reversal related to the association between 
information gathering and positive post-announcement returns, I regress CAR[51,75] on 
INFO_ACCESS and INFO_ACC_FILING. In this time period, one might expect that much of 
the uncertainty associated with the prior earnings announcement would have dissipated 
(especially given that the subsequent quarter’s earnings would have been announced during 
this period). Therefore, a negative coefficient would indicate a longer-term overreaction 
(perhaps due to attention, rather than learning). I find that neither of the coefficients is close to 
                                                          
23 I allow seven calendar days for investors to process the information in the 10-Q or 10-K (as opposed to two 
days for the earnings announcement). This is based on the significantly greater length and complexity of these 
documents, as well as the empirical observation that these filings are downloaded at abnormally high levels for 
weeks after they are filed (Drake et al. 2014b). 
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any level of statistical significance, which suggests that the positive post-announcement returns 
are not due to information gathering being related to an over- or under-reaction to the earnings 
news.   
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CHAPTER 6 
Alternative explanations and robustness tests 
 There are several potential alternative explanations that could be raised for the results 
presented in this paper. In this section, I briefly describe these alternatives and discuss their 
validity. 
6.1 – (Irrational) attention-driven buying 
Prior research has found that increased investor attention toward a particular stock results in 
price increases, followed by subsequent reversals (Da et al. 2011). The findings presented in 
Section 5 of this paper document a subsequent increase in price associated with investor 
information gathering, which might initially seem consistent with (irrational) investor attention 
driving price higher. However, there are at least two reasons why this is unlikely to drive the 
results.  First, if price increases were being driven solely by the increased demand associated 
with (irrational) investor attention, I would expect the returns to reverse over time.  The 
evidence in Tables 6 and 8 suggests that the positive abnormal returns do not reverse (even 
after the next quarter’s earnings have been announced).  Second, attention-driven increases in 
price should be present regardless of the level of uncertainty about the interpretation of 
earnings. Instead, the results in Table 6, Panel B suggest that the association between positive 
returns and information gathering is significantly greater when uncertainty about the 
interpretation of earnings is high. Both of these results are inconsistent with positive post-
announcement returns being driven purely by attention-driven buying, but they are consistent 
with the presence of an uncertainty premium. 
46 
 
6.2 – Negativity bias 
The strong return reversal for bad news firms with high search may be due to investors 
exhibiting negativity bias. Negativity bias is a cognitive bias exhibited by a tendency to be 
more affected by negative stimuli than positive, even if they are of the same magnitude (Akhtar 
et al. 2011). While a negativity bias would cause an overreaction to bad news (and may 
contribute to the magnitude of the initial reaction to bad news), it shouldn’t cause an under-
reaction to good news. The fact that information gathering is also associated with positive 
future returns for good news is inconsistent with negativity bias. Additionally, negativity bias 
is an unconditional bias, meaning it should not be affected by the level of uncertainty about 
the interpretation of earnings. However, as noted, the association between information 
gathering and positive post-announcement returns is apparent only when uncertainty about the 
interpretation of earnings is high. The conditional nature of this association is further evidence 
that the result is not driven by investors exhibiting a negativity bias. 
6.3 – Time-varying risk premiums 
The results could be attributable to changes in risk premiums or changes in investor 
risk preferences. While prior experimental research has provided evidence that individuals 
distinguish between risk and uncertainty when making decisions (Ellsberg 1961; Smith et al. 
2002; Hsu et al. 2005), making this distinction outside of a laboratory setting is very difficult.  
One potential distinction that might be drawn between uncertainty and risk is related to 
the importance of information quality on firm value.  The theoretical model of Epstein and 
Schneider (2008) predicts that information quality has a first-order effect on price for an 
ambiguity-averse investor, while it has a second-order effect on price for a Bayesian investor 
who has no model uncertainty.  For example, if uncertainty about mean earnings changes 
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because of company-specific news, a Bayesian investor (who has no concerns about model 
uncertainty) treats this as a change in risk, which results in only a second-order effect on the 
valuation of the company as long as the covariance with the market remains the same.  
However, ambiguity-averse investors respond as if mean earnings have actually changed, 
which is a first-order effect.  Thus, the effect of ambiguous information on price would be 
much greater in the case of an ambiguity-averse investor.   
My analyses can’t explicitly determine if investors have a full understanding of the 
processes that generate returns and earnings or if, in contrast, they are uncertain about certain 
parameters or have multiple likelihoods in mind when processing signals of uncertain quality.  
However, the relatively stark results in Table 7 demonstrate the apparent importance of 
information in explaining the association between information gathering and positive post-
announcement returns.  The results in Table 7 suggest that the ambiguity of information in the 
earnings announcement is an important factor in how investors respond and in the effect this 
has on future returns.  While this certainly doesn’t rule out the possibility that changing risk 
premiums or preferences are contributing to the association between information gathering and 
future returns, the importance of information ambiguity is less consistent with a standard 
Bayesian investor who knows all the model parameters and more consistent with an ambiguity-
averse investor who has a first-order concern about information uncertainty. 
To further address concerns that the results may be attributable to changes in risk 
premiums or investor risk preferences, I estimate the regression from column (1) of Table 6, 
Panel B using several risk-adjusted return measures as the dependent variable.  The results of 
this analysis are found in Table 9.  The dependent variables in Columns (1) and (2) are 
abnormal returns from a market return model, where Column (1) is the cumulative abnormal 
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return (CAR_MM[2,50]) and Column (2) is the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR_MM[2,50]).  The dependent variables in Columns (3) and (4) are abnormal returns 
from a Carhart 4-factor model, where Column (3) is the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR_4FAC[2,50]) and Column (4) is the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR_4FAC[2,50]).  The pre-event-window estimation period for each of these models is a 
45-trading-day window that ends six trading days prior to the earnings announcement.  In each 
case, the coefficient on INFO_ACCESS is positive and statistically significant, which is 
consistent with the result in column (1) of Table 6, Panel B – that increased information 
gathering at the time of the earnings announcement is associated with positive future abnormal 
returns.  These return measures attempt to control for risk factors that have been identified in 
prior literature, as well as alternative methods of computing the compounded return.  While 
this analysis cannot completely rule out the presence of changes in risk premiums or investor 
risk preferences as contributing factors in this relation, it provides further evidence that these 
factors are not driving the result. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
Despite the pervasiveness of uncertainty and the importance of information in capital 
markets, we have a limited understanding of how uncertainty influences information gathering 
and learning in capital-market settings.  Guided by the intuition of theories of information 
choice, I find that investors gather more firm-level information as the earnings number deviates 
further from their prior beliefs and as firm- and market-level uncertainty increase prior to the 
earnings announcement. The influence of firm-level uncertainty on information gathering 
declines as market-wide uncertainty increases, which is consistent with theories of rational 
attention and category learning (Peng and Xiong 2006).  More broadly, the results confirm a 
prevailing theoretical and experimental connection between uncertainty and information 
seeking that spans a broad range of literatures (Shannon 1949; Kahneman 1973; Sims 2003; 
Case 2012).   
The connection between uncertainty and information gathering also influences 
predictions about how these activities may be associated with stock returns.  I find that the 
intensity of investors’ information-gathering efforts is associated with negative abnormal 
returns in the earnings announcement period and positive abnormal returns in the post-
announcement period.  These associations are significant for both good and bad news, which 
might initially seem puzzling – i.e., information gathering leading to an apparent under-
reaction to good news and an overreaction to bad news.  However, these return patterns are 
consistent with theoretical predictions about how investors respond to uncertainty (Brown et 
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al. 1988; Campbell and Hentschel 1992; Epstein and Schneider 2008). Moreover, the 
association between information gathering and positive post-announcement returns is strongest 
in situations where information gathering is less likely to fully resolve uncertainty and where 
supplemental information available to investors is itself ambiguous.  Taken together, the results 
suggest that measures of investor attention and information gathering inherently capture 
investor uncertainty and that investors require a premium for tolerating residual uncertainty 
that is not resolved by gathering information.  
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Table 1 – Sample Selection 
Details No. of Observations 
Quarterly earnings announcements between 2003 and March 2011 with 
coverage in Compustat (gvkey and CIK), CRSP (permno), IBES (analyst 
dispersion and unexpected earnings calculations), and EDGAR database 
82,064  
Less: Observations without coverage in Thomson Reuters 13f institutional 
ownership database (11,663) 
Less: Observations with missing data in the variables used (4,582) 
Sample used for analyses where implied volatility is not required 65,819  
Less: Observations without coverage in OptionMetrics database for 
implied volatilities  (15,682) 
Sample used for analyses where implied volatility is required 50,137  
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
INFO_ACCESS is a measure of the abnormal EDGAR filing downloads for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings 
announcement (see Appendix A for additional details), INFO_ACC_FILING is a measure of the abnormal filing downloads 
for the [0,6] trading-day window around filing of 10-K or 10-Q (see Appendix A for additional details), ANALYST_UE is the 
firm’s unexpected earnings (adjusted for analysts’ consensus forecast), scaled by price, CAR[0,1] and CAR[2,50] are, 
respectively, the cumulative abnormal stock return for the [0,1] and [2,25] trading-day window around the earnings 
announcement, GOOGLE is the Google Search Volume Index for the stock's ticker symbol for the [0,1] trading-day window 
around the earnings announcement, LN_MVE is the natural log of the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting 
quarter, BOOK_MARKET is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting 
quarter, INST_OWN is percentage of institutional ownership as of the end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, 
ANALYST_FOL is the number of analysts following the firm at the end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, 
EA_COUNT is the number of earnings announcements on the same calendar day as the firm's earnings announcement, 
IMP_VOL30 is the average of the implied volatility for a standardized 30-day put and call option from the OptionMetrics 
Standardized Options dataset two trading days prior to the earnings announcement date, ANALYST_DISP is the standard 
deviation of analysts' earnings forecasts as of the end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, divided by the mean 
share price for that month, SDEV_PRE_RET is the standard deviation of stock returns for the 60 trading days ending on trading 
day t-3 before the earnings announcement, VIX is the volatility index on the S&P 500 two trading days prior to the earnings 
announcement, HI_VIX is equal to 1 if VIX is greater than 20, and 0 otherwise (the level of 20 was chosen because it is the 
approximate mean and median of the VIX for 1993–2002 – the 10 years leading up to the sample period), 10K_LAG is the 
number of calendar days between the earnings announcement and the filing of the 10-K or 10-Q, BAD_NEWS is an indicator 
equal to 1 if the company misses analysts’ consensus earnings and 0 otherwise 
Variable            N Mean P25 P50 P75 Std Dev 
Dependent Variables             
INFO_ACCESS 65,819 0.564 -0.005 0.366 0.888 0.87 
INFO_ACC_FILING 65,819 0.633 0.082 0.391 0.862 1.69 
CAR[0,1] 65,819 0.001 -0.040 0.000 0.042 0.09 
CAR[2,50] 65,819 0.007 -0.078 0.001 0.082 0.18 
GOOGLE 5,696 1.208 0.664 1.025 1.270 2.24 
              
Independent Variables             
ANALYST_UE 65,819 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.02 
LN_MVE 65,819 7.109 5.944 6.958 8.117 1.62 
BOOK_MARKET 65,819 0.564 0.277 0.463 0.721 0.63 
INST_OWN 65,819 0.709 0.560 0.749 0.883 0.24 
ANALYST_FOL 65,819 1.986 1.609 1.946 2.398 0.58 
EA_COUNT 65,819 103 40 93 160 68.64 
IMP_VOL30 50,137 0.481 0.324 0.439 0.587 0.22 
ANALYST_DISP 65,819 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.03 
SDEV_PRE_RET 65,819 0.024 0.014 0.020 0.029 0.02 
VIX 65,819 21.802 15.280 19.170 24.230 10.82 
HI_VIX 65,819 0.455 0 0 1 0.50 
10K_LAG 65,819 12 1 9 18 11.96 
BAD_NEWS 65,819 0.297 0 0 1 0.46 
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Table 3 – Correlations 
INFO_ACCESS is a measure of the abnormal EDGAR filing downloads for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement (see Appendix A for additional details), 
INFO_ACC_FILING is a measure of the abnormal filing downloads for the [0,6] trading-day window around filing of 10-K or 10-Q (see Appendix A for additional details), 
ANALYST_UE is the firm’s unexpected earnings (adjusted for analysts’ consensus forecast), scaled by price, CAR[0,1] and CAR[2,50] are, respectively, the cumulative abnormal 
stock return for the [0,1] and [2,25] trading-day window around the earnings announcement, GOOGLE is the Google Search Volume Index for the stock's ticker symbol for the [0,1] 
trading-day window around the earnings announcement, LN_MVE is the natural log of the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, BOOK_MARKET is the book 
value of equity divided by the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, INST_OWN is percentage of institutional ownership as of the end of the month prior to 
the earnings announcement, ANALYST_FOL is the number of analysts following the firm at the end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, EA_COUNT is the number of 
earnings announcements on the same calendar day as the firm's earnings announcement, IMP_VOL30 is the average of the implied volatility for a standardized 30-day put and call 
option from the OptionMetrics Standardized Options dataset two trading days prior to the earnings announcement date, ANALYST_DISP is the standard deviation of analysts' earnings 
forecasts as of the end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, divided by the mean share price for that month, SDEV_PRE_RET is the standard deviation of stock returns 
for the 60 trading days ending on trading day t-3 before the earnings announcement, VIX is the volatility index on the S&P 500 two trading days prior to the earnings announcement, 
HI_VIX is equal to 1 if VIX is greater than 20, and 0 otherwise (the level of 20 was chosen because it is the approximate mean and median of the VIX for 1993–2002 – the 10 years 
leading up to the sample period), 10K_LAG is the number of calendar days between the earnings announcement and the filing of the 10-K or 10-Q, BAD_NEWS is an indicator equal 
to 1 if the company misses analysts’ consensus earnings and 0 otherwise 
  Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) INFO_ACCESS 1 0.28 -0.04 0.02 0.15 -0.03 0.15 -0.01 0.06 0.14 -0.09 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.11 -0.16 0.02 
(2) CAR[0,1] 0.30 1 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.10 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 
(3) CAR[2,50] -0.04 -0.01 1 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.27 
(4) GOOGLE 0.00 0.00 0.04 1 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.00 -0.01 
(5) WIKIPEDIA 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.02 1 -0.03 0.22 -0.02 -0.07 0.12 -0.03 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.00 -0.01 
(6) ANALYST_UE -0.06 -0.09 0.09 0.07 -0.03 1 0.08 -0.17 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.14 -0.26 -0.21 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.32 
(7) LN_MVE 0.13 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.22 0.09 1 -0.22 0.27 0.62 -0.03 -0.52 -0.24 -0.47 -0.08 -0.08 0.10 -0.15 
(8) BOOK_MARKET 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.21 -0.15 1 -0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.17 0.29 0.24 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.09 
(9) INST_OWN 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.35 0.01 1 0.32 0.03 -0.08 -0.13 -0.18 0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.09 
(10) ANALYST_FOL 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.13 0.01 0.30 -0.06 0.04 1 0.01 -0.15 -0.08 -0.18 0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.12 
(11) EA_COUNT -0.05 -0.14 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.10 0.00 0.09 -0.06 1 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.09 -0.16 -0.02 
(12) IMP_VOL30 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.23 -0.28 0.23 0.23 0.15 0.04 1 0.38 0.78 0.53 0.36 -0.11 0.12 
(13) ANALYST_DISP 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.58 -0.17 0.29 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.40 1 0.44 0.13 0.14 -0.09 0.12 
(14) SDEV_PRE_RET 0.13 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.33 -0.28 0.30 0.20 0.12 0.02 0.83 0.54 1 0.40 0.27 -0.10 0.12 
(15) VIX 0.17 0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.05 -0.08 -0.05 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.71 0.11 0.50 1 0.65 -0.11 0.05 
(16) HI_VIX 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.07 -0.02 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.52 0.12 0.39 0.65 1 -0.19 0.04 
(17) 10K_LAG -0.15 0.20 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.08 0.14 -0.26 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.13 -0.12 1 -0.05 
(18) BAD_NEWS 0.06 0.03 -0.24 -0.03 -0.02 -0.26 -0.10 0.14 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.05 -0.01 1 
Spearman correlations are in the lower left and Pearson pairwise correlations are in the upper right 
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Table 4 – Economic drivers of information gathering 
INFO_ACCESS is a measure of the abnormal EDGAR filing downloads for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings 
announcement (see Appendix A for additional details), ABS_ANALYST_UE_DEC is the decile rank of the absolute value of 
ANALYST_UE, where ANALYST_UE is the firm’s unexpected earnings (adjusted for analysts’ consensus forecast), scaled by 
price, CAR[0,1] is the cumulative abnormal stock return for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement, 
LN_MVE is the natural log of the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, BOOK_MARKET is the book 
value of equity divided by the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, INST_OWN is percentage of 
institutional ownership as of the end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, ANALYST_FOL is the number of 
analysts following the firm at the end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, EA_COUNT is the number of earnings 
announcements on the same calendar day as the firm's earnings announcement, IMP_VOL30 is the average of the implied 
volatility for a standardized 30-day put and call option from the OptionMetrics Standardized Options dataset  two trading days 
prior to the earnings announcement date, ANALYST_DISP is the standard deviation of analysts' earnings forecasts as of the 
end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, divided by the mean share price for that month,  SDEV_PRE_RET is 
the standard deviation of stock returns for the 60 trading days ending on trading day t-3 before the earnings announcement, 
VIX is the volatility index on the S&P 500 two trading days prior to the earnings announcement. 
Panel A: Information gathering and deviations from prior beliefs 
  Dependent Variable - INFO_ACCESS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
ABS_ANALYST_UE_DEC 0.0243***   0.0191*** 0.0046*** 
  (13.77)   (11.02) (3.08) 
ABS(CAR [0,1])   1.7084*** 1.5981*** 1.3591*** 
    (22.86) (21.73) (18.98) 
LN_MVE 0.0916*** 0.0972*** 0.1052*** 0.0492*** 
  (15.70) (16.97) (18.12) (3.88) 
BOOK_MARKET -0.0353*** -0.0136 -0.0321*** -0.0228* 
  (-2.80) (-1.08) (-2.58) (-1.67) 
INST_OWN 0.0750*** 0.0273 0.0427 -0.0276 
  (2.84) (1.03) (1.63) (-0.73) 
ANALYST_FOL 0.0224* 0.0042 0.0058 0.0078 
  (1.71) (0.33) (0.46) (0.63) 
EA_COUNT -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0010*** 
  (-13.75) (-13.14) (-13.41) (-9.26) 
          
Firm FE N N N Y 
Observations 65,819 65,819 65,819 65,819 
Adj. R-squared 0.125 0.135 0.138 0.266 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
Firm, calendar quarter, fiscal quarter, and day-of-week fixed effects are included in all specifications 
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Panel B:  Information gathering and uncertainty of prior beliefs 
  Dependent Variable - INFO_ACCESS 
  Firm-level uncertainty   Macroeconomic uncertainty 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
                
IMP_VOL*VIX             -0.0140*** 
              (-8.17) 
IMP_VOL 0.2415***         0.1286*** 0.5542*** 
  (6.77)         (3.26) (9.38) 
ANALYST_DISP   0.5187***           
    (2.92)           
SDEV_PRE_RET     1.3923***         
      (3.47)         
VIX         0.0047*** 0.0034*** 0.0128*** 
          (5.09) (3.30) (7.23) 
ABS_ANALYST_UE_DEC 0.0035* 0.0045*** 0.0045***   0.0166*** 0.0164*** 0.0153*** 
  (1.95) (3.03) (3.04)   (9.08) (9.00) (8.36) 
ABS(CAR[0,1]) 1.4898*** 1.3516*** 1.3362***   1.3706*** 1.3293*** 1.3411*** 
  (16.74) (18.85) (18.55)   (15.59) (15.01) (15.72) 
LN_MVE 0.0802*** 0.0553*** 0.0566***   0.0920*** 0.1014*** 0.1113*** 
  (5.36) (4.33) (4.41)   (7.23) (7.85) (8.76) 
BOOK_MARKET -0.0301 -0.0307** -0.0313**   0.0880*** 0.0807*** 0.0704*** 
  (-1.63) (-2.20) (-2.23)   (4.54) (4.12) (3.69) 
INST_OWN 0.0534 -0.0226 -0.0191   0.0396 0.0386 0.0254 
  (1.20) (-0.60) (-0.51)   (0.93) (0.90) (0.60) 
ANALYST_FOL 0.0049 0.0063 0.0063   0.1475*** 0.1479*** 0.1397*** 
  (0.34) (0.51) (0.51)   (9.04) (9.07) (8.56) 
EA_COUNT -0.0011*** -0.0010*** -0.0010***   -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
  (-8.10) (-9.29) (-9.28)   (-3.23) (-3.21) (-3.24) 
                
Quarter FE Y Y Y   N N N 
Observations 50,137 65,819 65,819   50,137 50,137 50,137 
Adj. R-squared 0.272 0.266 0.266   0.203 0.204 0.206 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
Standard errors are clustered by firm 
Firm, fiscal quarter, and day-of-week fixed effects are included in all specifications 
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Table 5 – Information gathering and traditional tests of market efficiency 
CAR[2,50] is the cumulative abnormal stock return for the [2,50] trading-day window following the earnings announcement, 
INFO_ACCESS is a measure of the abnormal EDGAR filing downloads for the [0,1] trading-day window around the 
earnings announcement (see Appendix A for additional details), UE_DEC is the decile rank of the firm's unexpected 
earnings (either analyst- or seasonally adjusted, as indicated in the table), LN_MVE is the natural log of the market value of 
equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, BOOK_MARKET is the book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, INST_OWN is percentage of institutional ownership as of the end of the month 
prior to the earnings announcement, ANALYST_FOL is the number of analysts following the firm at the end of the month 
prior to the earnings announcement, EA_COUNT is the number of earnings announcements on the same calendar day as the 
firm's earnings announcement, ABS_ANALYST_UE_DEC is the decile rank of the absolute value of ANALYST_UE, where 
ANALYST_UE is the firm’s unexpected earnings (adjusted for analysts’ consensus forecast), scaled by price, CAR[0,1] is the 
cumulative abnormal stock return for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement 
 
  Dependent Variable - CAR [2,50]   ABS(CAR [2, 50]) 
  Analyst-adj. UE Seasonally Adj. UE     
Variable (1) (2)   (3) 
         
INFO_ACCESS*UE_DEC -0.0010** -0.0017***    
  (-2.10) (-3.65)    
INFO_ACCESS 0.0051*** 0.0045***  0.0054*** 
  (3.12) (3.29)  (6.24) 
LN_MVE*ANALYST_UE_DEC 0.0002 0.0007**    
  (0.83) (2.53)    
BOOK_MARKET*UE_DEC 0.0025*** 0.0012    
  (2.90) (1.31)    
ANALYST_FOL*UE_DEC -0.0015** -0.0019***    
  (-2.21) (-2.74)    
INST_OWN*UE_DEC -0.0023* -0.0045***    
  (-1.67) (-3.32)    
EA_COUNT*UE_DEC 0.0000* 0.0000    
  (1.92) (0.94)    
UE_DEC 0.0020 0.0032    
  (1.06) (1.63)    
LN_MVE -0.0678*** -0.0677***  -0.0369*** 
  (-15.18) (-15.34)  (-12.28) 
BOOK_MARKET 0.0213*** 0.0261***  0.0258*** 
  (2.98) (3.98)  (5.50) 
ANALYST_FOL -0.0369*** -0.0384***  -0.0119* 
  (-4.06) (-4.35)  (-1.89) 
INST_OWN -0.0005 -0.0009  0.0043** 
  (-0.14) (-0.31)  (2.04) 
EA_COUNT -0.0000 0.0000  -0.0000** 
  (-0.14) (0.20)  (-2.09) 
ABS_ANALYST_UE_DEC      0.0004* 
       (1.65) 
ABS(CAR [0,1])      0.1276*** 
       (7.35) 
         
Observations 65,819 65,819  65,819 
Adj. R-squared 0.087 0.088  0.230 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
Standard errors are clustered by announcement date 
Firm, calendar quarter, fiscal quarter, and day-of-week fixed effects are included in all specifications 
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Table 6 – Information gathering, uncertainty, and stock returns around the earnings announcement 
CAR[2,50] is the cumulative abnormal stock return for the [2,50] trading-day window following the earnings announcement, INFO_ACCESS is a measure of the abnormal EDGAR 
filing downloads for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement (see Appendix A for additional details), UNCERTAIN is a measure of uncertainty about the 
interpretation of earnings (VIX – the level of the VIX two trading days prior to the earnings announcement, IMP_VOL – firm-specific implied volatility two trading days prior to the 
earnings announcement, and UE – an indicator equal to 1 if analyst-adjusted earnings is in the top or bottom quintile, and 0 otherwise), GOOGLE is the Google Search Volume 
Index for the stock's ticker symbol for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement, ANALYST_UE_DEC is the decile rank of ANALYST_UE, where 
ANALYST_UE is the firm’s unexpected earnings (adjusted for analysts’ consensus forecast), scaled by price, CAR[0,1] is the cumulative abnormal stock return for the [0,1] trading-
day window around the earnings announcement, LN_MVE is the natural log of the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, BOOK_MARKET is the book value 
of equity divided by the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, INST_OWN is percentage of institutional ownership as of the end of the month prior to the 
earnings announcement, ANALYST_FOL is the number of analysts following the firm at the end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, EA_COUNT is the number of 
earnings announcements on the same calendar day as the firm's earnings announcement, CAR[0,1] is the cumulative abnormal stock return for the [0,1] trading-day window around 
the earnings announcement 
Panel A: Information gathering and announcement period stock returns  
  Dependent Variable - CAR[0,1] 
Variable 
Full Sample 
(1)   
UNCERTAIN  
(VIX) 
(2) 
UNCERTAIN 
(IMP_VOL) 
(3) 
UNCERTAIN  
(UE) 
(4)   
High VIX 
Good News 
(5) 
High VIX 
Bad News 
(6)   
High VIX 
GOOGLE 
(7) 
                      
INFO_ACCESS*UNCERTAIN     -0.0029*** -0.0026*** -0.0019**           
      (-3.17) (-2.85) (-1.96)           
INFO_ACCESS -0.0037***   -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0028***   -0.0016 -0.0127***     
  (-7.00)   (-3.75) (-4.44) (-4.92)   (-1.64) (-5.91)     
GOOGLE                   -0.0019 
                    (-0.71) 
UNCERTAIN     0.0015 0.0011 0.0015           
      (0.94) (0.91) (1.57)           
ANALYST_UE_DEC 0.0106***   0.0106*** 0.0106*** 0.0106***   0.0121*** 0.0188***   0.0112*** 
  (63.81)   (63.80) (63.83) (63.86)   (27.33) (8.81)   (9.43) 
LN_MVE -0.0144***   -0.0144*** -0.0145*** -0.0144***   -0.0269*** -0.0373***   -0.0507 
  (-10.51)   (-10.55) (-10.51) (-10.56)   (-7.82) (-7.20)   (-1.54) 
BOOK_MARKET 0.0044**   0.0042** 0.0043** 0.0043**   0.0057 0.0015   0.0423 
  (2.03)   (1.98) (2.02) (1.99)   (1.20) (0.32)   (0.81) 
INST_OWN -0.0080**   -0.0081** -0.0078* -0.0080**   -0.0201** 0.0001   0.1197 
  (-1.99)   (-2.00) (-1.93) (-1.98)   (-2.17) (0.01)   (1.07) 
ANALYST_FOL 0.0002   0.0003 0.0002 0.0002   0.0008 0.0069   0.0241* 
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  (0.18)   (0.19) (0.14) (0.16)   (0.23) (1.29)   (1.65) 
EA_COUNT -0.0000   -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000   -0.0000 -0.0000   -0.0000 
  (-0.82)   (-0.84) (-0.82) (-0.80)   (-0.76) (-0.70)   (-0.65) 
                      
Observations 65,819   65,819 65,819 65,819   20,434 9,525   1,742 
Adj. R-squared 0.139   0.140 0.140 0.139   0.107 0.091   0.051 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
Standard errors are clustered by announcement date 
Firm, calendar quarter, fiscal quarter, and day-of-week fixed effects are included in all specifications 
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Panel B: Information gathering and post-announcement stock returns 
  Dependent Variable - CAR[2,50] 
Variable 
Full Sample 
(1)  
UNCERTAIN  
(VIX) 
(2) 
UNCERTAIN 
(IMP_VOL) 
(3) 
UNCERTAIN  
(UE) 
(4)  
High VIX 
Good News 
(5) 
High VIX 
Bad News 
(6)  
High VIX 
GOOGLE 
(7) 
                   
INFO_ACCESS*UNCERTAIN    0.0097*** 0.0044** 0.0044*         
     (4.38) (2.30) (1.80)         
INFO_ACCESS 0.0036***  -0.0009 0.0012 0.0016  0.0050** 0.0228***    
  (2.93)  (-0.89) (1.30) (1.55)  (2.36) (3.61)   
GOOGLE                0.0073** 
                 (2.05) 
UNCERTAIN    -0.0071** -0.0119*** 0.0010         
     (-2.02) (-4.39) (0.46)         
ANALYST_UE_DEC 0.0013***  0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013***  0.0008 0.0067  0.0031 
  (3.68)  (3.70) (3.71) (3.71)  (0.89) (1.32)  (1.12) 
CAR[0,1] -0.0086  -0.0078 -0.0082 -0.0084  -0.0714*** -0.0934*  -0.0643 
  (-0.51)  (-0.47) (-0.49) (-0.50)  (-2.79) (-1.74)  (-1.06) 
LN_MVE -0.0677***  -0.0675*** -0.0687*** -0.0667***  -0.1263*** -0.1746***  -0.3075*** 
  (-15.08)  (-15.08) (-15.15) (-14.96)  (-12.67) (-9.43)  (-7.32) 
BOOK_MARKET 0.0238***  0.0242*** 0.0234*** 0.0237***  0.0380*** -0.0004  0.0755 
  (3.43)  (3.48) (3.37) (3.41)  (3.79) (-0.02)  (1.54) 
INST_OWN -0.0402***  -0.0400*** -0.0416*** -0.0403***  -0.0722*** -0.0255  0.0233 
  (-4.57)  (-4.55) (-4.74) (-4.58)  (-3.73) (-0.58)  (0.25) 
ANALYST_FOL -0.0026  -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0025  -0.0055 0.0033  -0.0285* 
  (-0.88)  (-0.91) (-0.90) (-0.86)  (-0.92) (0.24)  (-1.68) 
EA_COUNT 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 -0.0001  0.0002 
  (0.35)  (0.41) (0.35) (0.35)  (0.46) (-0.48)  (1.41) 
                   
Observations 65,819  65,819 65,819 65,819  20,434 9,525  1,742 
Adj. R-squared 0.086  0.087 0.087 0.086  0.127 0.125  0.152 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
Standard errors are clustered by announcement date 
Firm, calendar quarter, fiscal quarter, and day-of-week fixed effects are included in all specifications 
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Table 7 – Ambiguous information and post-announcement returns 
CAR[2,50] is the cumulative abnormal stock return for the [2,50] trading-day window following the earnings announcement, 
INFO_ACCESS is a measure of the abnormal EDGAR filing downloads for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings 
announcement (see Appendix A  for additional details), ANALYST_UE_DEC is the decile rank of ANALYST_UE, where 
ANALYST_UE is the firm’s unexpected earnings (adjusted for analysts’ consensus forecast), scaled by price, CAR[0,1] is the 
cumulative abnormal stock return for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement,  LN_MVE is the natural 
log of the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, BOOK_MARKET is the book value of equity divided 
by the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, INST_OWN is percentage of institutional ownership  as of 
the end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, ANALYST_FOL is the number of analysts following the firm at the 
end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, EA_COUNT is the number of earnings announcements on the same 
calendar day as the firm's earnings announcement 
 
  Dependent Variable - CAR[2,50] 
Variable 
Guide 
(1) 
No Guide 
(2)   
Low text 
complexity 
(3) 
High text 
complexity 
(4) 
            
INFO_ACCESS 0.0015 0.0055***   0.0003 0.0083*** 
  (0.93) (2.93)   (0.15) (3.99) 
ANALYST_UE_DEC 0.0019*** 0.0013**   0.0004 0.0014** 
  (3.33) (2.56)   (0.78) (2.28) 
CAR[0,1] -0.0426* -0.0087   -0.0132 0.0112 
  (-1.89) (-0.35)   (-0.51) (0.43) 
LN_MVE -0.0755*** -0.0902***   -0.0727*** -0.0845*** 
  (-11.99) (-13.82)   (-10.69) (-11.57) 
BOOK_MARKET 0.0557*** 0.0125   0.0249** 0.0259*** 
  (3.99) (1.49)   (2.17) (2.95) 
INST_OWN -0.0533*** -0.0539***   -0.0166 -0.0538*** 
  (-3.85) (-3.75)   (-1.09) (-3.05) 
ANALYST_FOL -0.0038 -0.0020   -0.0081* -0.0011 
  (-1.05) (-0.41)   (-1.69) (-0.23) 
EA_COUNT 0.0001** -0.0000   0.0000 -0.0000 
  (2.23) (-0.71)   (0.58) (-0.03) 
            
Observations 22,211 35,270   26,365 23,205 
Adj. R-squared 0.101 0.092   0.088 0.109 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
Standard errors are clustered by announcement date 
Firm, calendar quarter, fiscal quarter, and day-of-week fixed effects are included in all specifications 
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Table 8 – Information gathering, subsequent information, and post-announcement returns 
CAR[X,Y] is the cumulative abnormal stock return from trading day X to trading day Y following the earnings announcement 
(where the earnings announcement occurs on day zero), INFO_ACCESS is a measure of the abnormal EDGAR filing 
downloads for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement (see Appendix A for additional details), 
10K_LAG is the number of calendar days between the earnings announcement and the filing of the 10-K or 10-Q, 
INFO_ACC_FILING is a measure of the abnormal filing downloads for the [0,6] trading-day window around filing of 10-K 
or 10-Q (see Appendix A for additional details), ANALYST_UE_DEC is the decile rank of ANALYST_UE, where 
ANALYST_UE is the firm’s unexpected earnings (adjusted for analysts’ consensus forecast), scaled by price, CAR[0,1] is the 
cumulative abnormal stock return for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement, LN_MVE is the natural 
log of the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, BOOK_MARKET is the book value of equity divided 
by the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, INST_OWN is percentage of institutional ownership as of 
the end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, ANALYST_FOL is the number of analysts following the firm at the 
end of the month prior to the earnings announcement, EA_COUNT is the number of earnings announcements on the same 
calendar day as the firm's earnings announcement 
 
  Dependent Variable - CAR[2,25]   CAR[26,50]   CAR[51, 75] 
Variable 
High VIX 
(1) 
High VIX 
(2)   
High VIX 
(3)  
High VIX 
(4) 
            
INFO_ACCESS 0.0058*** 0.0051***  0.0032**  0.0001 
  (3.21) (2.92)  (2.05)  (0.08) 
10K_LAG   -0.0007***       
    (-2.89)       
INFO_ACC_FILING      0.0036**  -0.0006 
       (2.14)  (-0.55) 
ANALYST_UE_DEC 0.0015*** 0.0015***  -0.0011**  -0.0023*** 
  (3.32) (3.32)  (-2.48)  (-4.85) 
CAR[0,1] -0.0274 -0.0274  -0.0494**  -0.0955*** 
  (-1.31) (-1.31)  (-2.31)  (-5.46) 
LN_MVE -0.0621*** -0.0619***  -0.0799***  -0.0729*** 
  (-10.16) (-10.14)  (-10.77)  (-11.76) 
BOOK_MARKET 0.0216*** 0.0215***  -0.0026  0.0149* 
  (3.28) (3.25)  (-0.35)  (1.92) 
INST_OWN -0.0370*** -0.0375***  -0.0258*  -0.0493*** 
  (-3.11) (-3.16)  (-1.77)  (-3.10) 
ANALYST_FOL 0.0020 0.0023  -0.0072  -0.0117** 
  (0.53) (0.62)  (-1.57)  (-2.32) 
EA_COUNT -0.0000 -0.0000  0.0000  -0.0000 
  (-1.03) (-0.86)  (0.51)  (-0.47) 
            
Observations 29,959 29,959  29,959  29,959 
Adj. R-squared 0.076 0.077  0.085  0.090 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
Standard errors are clustered by announcement date 
Firm, calendar quarter, fiscal quarter, and day-of-week fixed effects are included in all specifications 
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Table 9 – Alternative return measures to control for risk factors 
BHAR[2,50] is the buy-and-hold abnormal stock return (where the value-weighted market return is subtracted from the firm's 
daily return) for the [2,50] trading-day window following the earnings announcement, CAR_MM[2,50], BHAR_MM[2,50], 
CAR_4FAC[2,50], and BHAR_4FAC[2,50] are abnormal return measures for the [2,50] trading-day window following the 
earnings announcement, where the abnormal returns are cumulative (CAR) or buy-and-hold (BHAR) and where the returns 
have been adjusted for risk factors identified in prior literature (MM and 4FAC indicate abnormal returns calculated using a 
market return model and Carhart 4-factor model, respectively), INFO_ACCESS is a measure of the abnormal EDGAR filing 
downloads for the [0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement (see Appendix A  for additional details), 
ANALYST_UE_DEC is the decile rank of ANALYST_UE, where ANALYST_UE is the firm’s unexpected earnings (adjusted 
for analysts’ consensus forecast), scaled by price, CAR[0,1] is the cumulative abnormal stock return for the [0,1] trading-day 
window around the earnings announcement,  LN_MVE is the natural log of the market value of equity as of the end of the 
reporting quarter, BOOK_MARKET is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity as of the end of the 
reporting quarter, INST_OWN is percentage of institutional ownership  as of the end of the month prior to the earnings 
announcement, ANALYST_FOL is the number of analysts following the firm at the end of the month prior to the earnings 
announcement, EA_COUNT is the number of earnings announcements on the same calendar day as the firm's earnings 
announcement 
 
  Dependent Variables 
Variable 
CAR_MM[2,50] 
(1) 
BHAR_MM[2,50] 
(2) 
CAR_4FAC[2,50] 
(3) 
BHAR_4FAC[2,50] 
(4) 
          
INFO_ACCESS 0.0055*** 0.0082*** 0.0067*** 0.0066*** 
  (4.34) (4.89) (4.14) (3.90) 
ANALYST_UE_DEC -0.0011*** -0.0031*** -0.0025*** -0.0022*** 
  (-2.74) (-5.67) (-4.97) (-4.02) 
CAR[0,1] 0.0220 0.0629*** 0.0515*** 0.0524** 
  (1.21) (2.66) (2.60) (2.51) 
LN_MVE -0.0726*** -0.0763*** -0.0747*** -0.0698*** 
  (-15.26) (-12.64) (-15.58) (-11.96) 
BOOK_MARKET 0.0363*** 0.0480*** 0.0508*** 0.0456*** 
  (3.59) (3.21) (5.54) (4.17) 
INST_OWN 0.0180* 0.1005*** 0.0870*** 0.0971*** 
  (1.73) (6.85) (6.22) (6.61) 
ANALYST_FOL 0.0158*** 0.0345*** 0.0331*** 0.0325*** 
  (4.92) (8.04) (7.92) (7.39) 
EA_COUNT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.54) (0.10) (0.58) (0.23) 
          
Observations 65,466 65,466 65,466 65,466 
Adj. R-squared 0.054 0.028 0.023 0.025 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
Standard errors are clustered by announcement date 
Firm, calendar quarter, fiscal quarter, and day-of-week fixed effects are included in all specifications 
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Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Description 
INFO_ACCESS 
Average of the daily abnormal download volume over the [0,1] 
trading-day interval around the earnings announcement, winsorized 
by quarter at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The daily abnormal 
download volume is calculated as the total filing downloads on 
EDGAR for the day minus the average filing downloads for that same 
weekday over an eight-week estimation period ending two weeks 
prior to the earnings announcement, scaled by the average filing 
downloads for the same weekday over the estimation period. 
INFO_ACC_FILING 
Average of the daily abnormal download volume over the [0,6] 
trading-day interval around the filing of the 10-K or 10-Q, winsorized 
by quarter at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The daily abnormal 
download volume is calculated as the total filing downloads on 
EDGAR for the day minus the average filing downloads for that same 
weekday over an eight-week estimation period ending two weeks 
prior to the earnings announcement, scaled by the average filing 
downloads for the same weekday over the estimation period.  
ANALYST_UE 
Unexpected earnings, calculated as IBES reported actual “street” 
earnings minus the median of the most recent individual analyst 
forecasts issued within the 90 days prior to the earnings 
announcement date scaled by the price per share as of the end of the 
quarter, winsorized by quarter at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
CAR[X,Y] 
Cumulative abnormal stock return from trading day X to trading day 
Y around the earnings announcement, where the abnormal return is 
the raw return minus the market value–weighted return. For example, 
CAR[0,1] is the cumulative abnormal return for the two trading days 
beginning with the day of the earnings announcement and ending on 
the trading day after the earnings announcement. 
GOOGLE 
Google Search Volume Index for the stock's ticker symbol for the 
[0,1] trading-day window around the earnings announcement. This 
data was provided by Michael Drake through his website 
(http://byuaccounting. net/drake/ProgramsData1.php). This data was 
used for analyses in Drake et al. (2012). 
LN_MVE Natural log of the market value of equity as of the end of the reporting quarter, winsorized by quarter at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Variable Name Description 
BOOK_MARKET 
Book value of equity divided by the market value of equity as of the 
end of the reporting quarter, winsorized by quarter at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
INST_OWN 
Percentage of institutional ownership as of the end of the month prior 
to the earnings announcement, winsorized by quarter at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. 
ANALYST_FOL 
Natural log of the number of analysts following the firm at the end of 
the month prior to the earnings announcement, winsorized by quarter 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
EA_COUNT Number of firms that report earnings on the same calendar day as the firm's earnings announcement. 
IMP_VOL30 
Thirty-day implied volatility for options on the firm’s stock from the 
OptionMetrics Standardized Options dataset two trading days prior 
to the earnings announcement, winsorized by quarter at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. 
ANALYST_DISP 
Standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts as of the end of the 
month prior to the earnings announcement, divided by the mean share 
price for that month, winsorized by quarter at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
SDEV_PRE_RET Standard deviation of the firm's stock returns for the 60 trading days ending on day t-3 before the earnings announcement. 
VIX Volatility index on the S&P 500 two trading days prior to the earnings announcement. 
BAD_NEWS Equal to 1 if ANALYST_UE is less than 0, and 0 otherwise. 
HI_VIX Equal to 1 if VIX is greater than 20, and 0 otherwise. 
10K_LAG The number of calendar days between the earnings announcement and the filing of the 10-K or 10-Q. 
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